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1. Introduction	  I	   take	   it	   for	   granted	   that	   legal	   institutions	   are	   artifacts.	   In	   general,	   this	   can	   very	  well	  be	  considered	  a	  trivial	  thesis	  in	  legal	  philosophy.	  As	  Brian	  Leiter	  writes:	  The	  concept	  of	  law	  is	  the	  concept	  of	  an	  artefact,	  that	  is,	  something	  that	  necessarily	  owes	  its	  existence	  to	  human	  activities	  intended	  to	  create	  that	  artefact.	  Even	  John	  Finnis,	  our	  leading	  natural	  law	  theorist,	  does	  not	  deny	  this	  point.	  I	  certainly	  do	  not	  understand	  Kelsen,	  Hart,	  Raz,	  Dickson	  or	  Shapiro	  to	  deny	  this	  claim.	  Those	  who	  might	  want	  to	  deny	  that	  law	  is	  an	  artefact	  concept	   are	   not	   my	   concern	   here;	   the	   extravagance	   of	   their	   metaphysical	   commitments	  would,	  I	  suspect,	  be	  a	  subject	  for	  psychological,	  not	  philosophical	  investigation.	  (Leiter	  2011,	  666).	  As	  trivial	  as	  this	  thesis	  may	  be,	  however,	  to	  my	  knowledge	  no	  legal	  philosopher	  has	  attempted	   an	   analysis	   of	   the	  peculiar	   reality	   of	   legal	   phenomena	   in	   terms	  of	   the	  reality	   of	   artifacts,	   and	   this	   is	   particularly	   striking	  because	   there	  has	  been	  much	  






discussion	  about	  artifacts	  in	  general	  philosophy	  (specifically	  analytic	  metaphysics)	  over	  the	  last	  twenty	  years.1	  Artifacts	  are	  regarded	  by	  most	  philosophers	  as	  objects	  which	  have	  been	  created	  by	  one	  or	  more	  authors	  with	  a	  certain	  intention	  in	  mind.	  It	  has	  certainly	  been	  Risto	  Hilpinen	  (1993)	  who	  has	  described	  the	  content	  of	  such	  a	  creative	  intentional	  state	  in	  the	  most	  accurate	  way	  (he	  appeals	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  sortal,	   thus	   identifying	   artifacts	   of	   a	   given	   kind	   in	   terms	   of	   their	   criteria	   of	  identity),	   but	   even	   Amie	   Thomasson	   has	   insisted	   on	   authorial	   intentions	   as	   the	  crucial	  aspect	  at	  the	  root	  of	  artifactual	  objects	  (see	  for	  example	  (Thomasson	  2003)	  and	  (Thomasson	  2007)).	  Other	  authors,	  such	  as	  Lynne	  Rudder	  Baker	  (2004),	  have	  maintained	   that	   the	   content	   of	   this	   authorial	   intention	   should	   be	   described	   in	  terms	  of	  essential	  functions:	  An	  artifact,	  in	  this	  view,	  is	  not	  simply	  an	  object	  which	  is	   intentionally	  created,	  but	   it	   is	  so	   for	  a	  given	  essential	  purpose.	  Both	  Hilpinen’s	  purely	   intentionalistic	   and	   Baker’s	   functionalistic	   theories	   of	   artifacts	   have	   been	  critically	  discussed	  by	  Wybo	  Houkes	  and	  Pieter	  Vermaas	  (2010)	  in	  terms	  of	  plans,	  use	   plans	   which	   characterize	   artifactual	   kinds	   and	   are	   the	   content	   of	   authorial	  intentions:	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  idea	  of	  intention	  and	  function	  is	  supplemented	  by	  that	  of	   plans	   for	   action.	   Moreover,	   Randall	   Dipert	   (1993)	   has	   stressed	   that	   the	  intentions	  which	  ground	  artifacts	  should	  be	  seen	   in	   their	  historical	  development,	  and	  thus	  he	  has	  traced	  artifacts	  to	  a	  given	  “deliberative”	  history	  consisting	  in	  the	  process	  of	  their	  creation	  and	  subsequent	  modifications.	  The	   concepts	   of	   intention,	   function,	   plan	   of	   action,	   and	   history	   are	   thus	   in	  competition	   to	   explain	   the	   ontology	   of	   artifacts.	   But,	   quite	   strikingly,	   a	   similar	  competition	  can	  be	  found	  at	  the	  core	  of	  legal	  theory.	  In	  general	  jurisprudence,	  the	  concepts	  of	  the	  legislator’s	  intention,	  the	  purpose	  of	  a	  norm,	  legislative	  history,	  and	  social	   plan	   have	   been	   attempting	   for	   a	   long	   time,	   either	   taken	   in	   isolation	   or	   in	  different	  combinations,	  to	  account	  both	  for	  the	  peculiar	  reality	  of	  legal	  institutions	  and	  for	  the	  way	  they	  must	  be	  interpreted.	  Many	  legal	  institutions	  trace	  back	  to	  an	  authoritative	   act	   which	   is	   intentional,	   whose	   content	   is	   often	   reconstructed	   in	  some	  form	  to	  interpret	  the	  most	  problematic	  aspects	  of	  that	  institution’s	  concrete	  application.	   But	   intention	   is	   not	   all:	   The	   idea	   that	   law	   cannot	   simply	   be	   the	  legislator’s	   invention	   and	   that	   it	   must	   be	   anchored	   in	   social	   life,	   thus	   pursuing	  definite	  social	  interests	  and	  purposes,	  is	  one	  of	  the	  crucial	  aspects	  of	  European	  and	  American	  anti-­‐formalism	  and	  is	  at	  the	  root	  of	  all	  kinds	  of	  teleological	  reasoning	  in	  legal	  interpretation.	  And,	  finally,	   just	  as	  Dipert	  has	  maintained	  that	  the	  intentions	  at	   the	   basis	   of	   artifacts	   should	   be	   seen	   dynamically,	   namely,	   as	   a	   sort	   of	   history	  whose	   reconstruction	   is	   complex	   and	   requires	   a	   certain	   amount	   of	   contextual	  considerations,	  similarly	  it	  is	  commonplace	  in	  legal	  theory	  to	  say	  that	  a	  given	  legal	  norm	  cannot	  be	   interpreted	   in	   isolation,	   and	   that	   every	   legal	   institution	  must	  be	  seen	   in	   light	  of	   the	  entire	   legal	   system	  or	  even	   in	   light	  of	   its	   “legislative	  history.”	  Such	   a	   striking	   parallelism	   between	   the	   domain	   of	   artifacts	   and	   that	   of	   legal	  institutions	  is	  a	  clue	  for	  legal	  ontology	  that	  deserves	  further	  attention.	  I	  will	  offer	  






my	  own	  interpretation	  of	  this	  parallelism	  in	  the	  first	  part	  of	  this	  paper	  (Sections	  2	  and	  3).	  In	   providing	   a	   theory	   of	   legal	   institutions	   as	   artifacts,	   one	   could	   be	   led	   to	   the	  conclusion	  that	  law	  is	  essentially	  an	  artificial	  phenomenon,	  something	  which	  does	  not	  bear	  any	  significant	  relationship	  to	  the	  natural	  domain.	  However,	  I	  think	  that	  such	   a	   conclusion	  would	  be	  mistaken.	   In	   fact,	   this	   is	   the	   second	   thesis	   I	  want	   to	  explore	  in	  this	  paper:	  not	  only	  that	  legal	  institutions	  are	  artifacts,	  but	  also	  that	  they	  can	  be	  artifacts	  which	  in	  some	  sense	  “mirror,”	  or	  imitate,	  some	  descriptions	  of	  the	  natural,	   pre-­‐social	   reality	   we	   live	   in.	   Thus,	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	  artifactuality	   of	   law,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   and	   whatever	   we	   call	   “natural”	   or	   also	  “factual”	  as	  opposed	  to	  “normative,”	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  is	  much	  more	  complex	  than	  may	  seem	  at	  first	  sight.	  What	  I	  would	  like	  to	  show	  is	  not	  that	  legal	  institutions	  are	  “natural”	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  have	  some	  feature	  which	  is	  not	  human-­‐dependent,	  as	  some	  natural	  law	  theorists	  would	  say,	  but	  rather	  that	  their	  conceptual	  content	  can	  depend	  on	  our	  conceptualization	  of	  the	  natural	  domain	  despite	  being	  entirely	  artifactual.	   This	   is	   what	   I	   will	   call	   the	   “institutional	   mimesis”	   behind	   several	  important	   instances	  of	   legal	  artifacts,	  and	  I	  will	  deal	  with	   it	   in	   the	  second	  part	  of	  this	  paper	  (Sections	  4	  and	  5).	  
2. Legal	  Institutions	  as	  Immaterial	  Artifacts	  In	  what	   follows	   I	  will	   adopt	  a	  historicist-­‐intentional	   theory	  of	  artifacts	   similar	   to	  that	   conceived	  by	  Randall	  Dipert	   in	  his	  work	  Artifacts,	  Art	  Works,	   and	  Agency,	   of	  1993	  (Dipert	  1993).	  My	  characterization	  of	  an	  artifact	  is	  defined	  by	  the	  following	  “formula,”	  which	  for	  reasons	  of	  simplicity	  I	  will	  be	  calling	  “ART”:	  ARTIFACT	  →	  History	  {Intention-­‐rooted	  creation	  process	  [Interaction	  plan	  (Mechanism)]}	  Let	  me	   explain	   the	   content	   of	   this	   brief	   statement.	   First,	   the	  ART	   formula	   states	  that	  being	  an	  artifact	   is	  a	  historical	  property,	  namely,	   that	   it	   consists	   in	  having	  a	  distinctive	  history:	  The	  history	  of	  artifacts	  traces	  back	  to	  a	  creation	  process	  rooted	  in	  human	  intentions.	  The	  expression	  “process”	   is	  aimed	  at	  capturing	  the	  fact	  that	  creating	  an	  artifact	   can	  very	  well	  be	  something	  which	   is	  extended	  over	   time	  and	  involves	   several	   acts	   of	   different	   persons:	   Clearly,	   in	   most	   cases	   involving	   the	  creation	  of	  artifacts	  there	  is	  no	  single	  act	  of	  creation	  made	  by	  this	  or	  that	  individual	  person,	   and	   it	   is	   important	   to	   keep	   distinct,	   in	   this	   regard,	   those	   persons	   who	  












and	  intentionally	  created	  but	   instead	  result	   from	  repetition	  of	   intentional	  actions	  related	  to	  them	  but	  not	  explicitly	  creative	  of	  them.	  I	  will	  call	  artifacts	  of	  this	  latter	  kind	  recurrence	  artifacts,	  as	  distinct	  from	  intended	  artifacts.	  Intended	  artifacts	  are	  created	  through	  intentional	  actions	  which	  have	  as	  their	  content	  an	  intention	  to	  produce	  an	  artifact	  of	  that	  kind:	  This	  is	  Hilpinen’s	  and	  Thomasson’s	  concept	  of	  an	  artifact,	  and	  we	  can	  trace	  to	  this	  concept	  all	  instances	  of	  authored	   objects.	   Recurrence	   artifacts	   are	   instead	   created	   through	   intentional	  actions	   whose	   content	   is	   in	   some	   sense	   related	   to	   the	   artifact	   but	   is	   not	   an	  intention	  to	  create	  an	  artifact	  of	  that	  kind.	  Now,	  what	  is	  crucial	  when	  focusing	  on	  recurrence	   artifacts	   is	   that,	   for	   a	   certain	   period	   of	   time	   (say,	   until	   time	   t),	  individuals	   simply	   behave	   and	   make	   things	   while	   not	   realizing	   that	   they	   are	  concurring	  in	  creating	  an	  artifact,	  and	  after	  t	  they	  progressively	  become	  aware	  of	  the	  artifact’s	  existence	  and	  of	  its	  purpose	  and	  role.	  Let	  us	  illustrate	  by	  going	  back	  to	  the	  example	  of	   trails.	  Many	  people	  may	  have	  crossed	  the	   forest	  without	  knowing	  that	   in	  so	  doing	   they	  were	   tracing	  a	   trail.	  But	   in	   time	  the	   trail	  becomes	  apparent	  and	  begins	   to	  be	  used	  as	  such,	   that	   is,	  as	  an	  artifactual	  means	   to	  cross	   the	   forest	  without	  getting	   lost,	  and	   in	   this	  process	   it	  also	  makes	   its	  appearance	   in	  standard	  discourse.	  People	  start	  referring	  to	  the	  trail,	  to	  its	  purpose	  and	  possible	  use—as	  by	  saying,	  “There’s	  a	  trail	  there:	  use	  it	  to	  go	  home”—and	  in	  this	  way	  the	  trail	  acquires	  the	  same	  kind	  of	  objectuality	  that	  other	  authored	  artifactual	  objects	  had	  from	  the	  outset,	   namely,	   from	   the	   moment	   of	   their	   creation.	   Clearly,	   human	   discourse	   is	  crucial	   in	   this	   process	   by	  which	   recurrence	   artifacts	   emerge.	   In	   fact,	   the	   artifact	  could	  not	  even	  have	  an	  independent	  standing	  if	  people	  did	  not	  take	  to	  referring	  to	  it	   as	   an	   independent	   object	   with	   a	   distinctive	   purpose.	   And	   this	   progressive	  linguistic	   emergence	  mirrors	   a	   fundamental	   change	   in	   the	   content	   of	   intentional	  states	   that	   accompany	   actions	   done	   with	   that	   artifact.	   Suddenly,	   the	   content	   of	  intentional	  behaviour	  on	   the	  part	  of	  humans	   in	  a	  given	  community	  shifts	   from	  “I	  intend	   to	   do	   Y”	   to	   something	   like	   “I	   intend	   to	   make	   use	   of	   this	   artifact,	   whose	  purpose	   is	   to	  allow	  me	   to	  do	  Y.”	  People	  do	  not	   simply	   cross	   the	   forest	  anymore:	  They	  start	  to	  make	  use	  of	  the	  trail	  as	  a	  way	  to	  cross	  the	  forest.	  And	  by	  that	  time	  the	  trail	  will	  have	  fully	  emerged	  as	  a	  new	  artifact	  in	  that	  community.2	  This	   process	   of	   progressive	   emergence	   of	   recurrence	   artifacts	   in	   common	  consciousness	   (and	   discourse)	   I	   will	   call	   “artifactual	   apperception.”	   This	  expression	   is	   obviously	   drawn	   from	   the	   common	   philosophical	   meaning	   of	   the	  term	  apperception	   as	   “consciousness	   of	   (or	   reflection	   on)	   our	   own	   perceptions.”	  Indeed,	   this	   process	   of	   reflection	   on	   the	   content	   of	   our	   own	   intentional	   states	   is	  similar	  to	  what	  happens	  with	  recurrence	  artifacts.	  From	  time	  t	  onward,	  people	  are	  conscious	   that	   they	   are	   making	   use	   of	   something	   specifically	   meant	   for	   a	   given	  purpose,	   whereas	   before	   that	   time	   they	  were	   simply	   behaving	   in	  whatever	  way	  happened	   to	   enable	   them	   to	   achieve	   the	   same	  purpose.	   From	   the	   appearance	   of	  












impossible	  for	  humans	  to	  pass	  through.	  Hence,	  among	  other	  things,	  the	  wall	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  defence	  against	  unwanted	  intrusions.	  While	  Houkes	  and	  Vermaas’	  use	  plan	  consists	  of	  an	  ordered	  set	  of	  actions	  towards	  a	   given	   goal,	   an	   interaction	  plan	   in	  my	   sense	   consists	   of	   a	   conditional	   statement	  connecting	  an	  interaction	  between	  humans	  and	  an	  artifact,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  a	  typical	   result	   relevant	   for	   those	   humans,	   on	   the	   other.	   Three	   elements	   are	  therefore	   essential	   for	   interaction	   plans:	   (a)	   a	   conditional	   structure,	   (b)	   a	  description	  of	  the	  interaction	  between	  humans	  and	  the	  artifact	  (or	  some	  part	  of	  it)	  in	   the	   protasis,	   and	   (c)	   a	   description	   of	   some	   results	   for	   those	   humans	   in	   the	  apodosis.	  This	   connection	  between	   interaction	  and	   results,	  which	   is	  described	   in	  the	  interaction	  plan,	  sums	  up	  what	  an	  artifact	  is	  for.	  For	  example,	  while	  there	  is	  no	  definite	  use	  plan	  for	  a	  wall,	  an	  interaction	  plan	  for	  a	  wall	  can	  be	  stated	  as	  follows:	  If	  there	  is	  this	  wall	  at	  a	  given	  place,	  and	  if	  a	  person	  arrives	  at	  that	  place	  in	  front	  of	  this	  wall,	  then	  that	  person	  will	  not	  be	  able	  to	  move	  across	  that	  place.	  Notice,	   moreover,	   that	   interaction	   plans	   can	   be	   combined	   and	   nested.	   Hence	   a	  laptop,	  for	  example,	  is	  obviously	  connected	  with	  a	  lot	  of	  different	  interaction	  plans	  for	   different	   purposes,	   and	   these	   interaction	   plans	   cannot	   but	   refer	   to	   nested	  interaction	  plans	  of	  the	  artifacts	  which	  are	  the	  components	  of	  the	  laptop.	  Thus,	  in	  order	  to	  carry	  out	  the	  laptop’s	  “e-­‐mail	  service”	  interaction	  plan,	  which	  is	  only	  one	  of	  that	  artifact’s	  many	  different	  interaction	  plans,	  several	  interaction	  plans	  must	  be	  carried	   out	   with	   the	   laptop’s	   keyboard	   and	   monitor,	   and	   before	   that	   with	   its	  “power”	  button.	  All	  these	  interaction	  plans	  are	  included	  as	  subplans	  in	  the	  overall	  interaction	  plan	  that	  makes	  it	  possible	  to	  send	  an	  e-­‐mail.	  The	  last	  element	  of	  the	  ART	  formula	  is	  the	  mechanism,	  representing	  the	  objective	  grounds	  of	  an	  artifact’s	  interaction	  plan.	  I	  am	  deliberately	  using	  the	  term	  in	  a	  broad	  sense	   here,	   even	   though	   it	   is	   borrowed	   from	   the	   domain	   of	   technical	   artifacts.	  Hence,	  I	  will	  be	  speaking	  of	  the	  mechanism	  of	  legal	  artifacts,	  but	  obviously	  I	  do	  not	  consider	  these	  artifacts	  to	  be	  objects	  that	  have	  a	  mechanism	  in	  the	  ordinary	  sense	  of	  this	  word.	  We	  will	  shortly	  see	  what	  I	  mean.	  Clearly,	  in	  most	  cases,	  the	  authors	  of	  artifacts	   do	   not	   have	   access	   to	   the	   objective	   features	   of	   the	   world	   that	   can	  constitute	   a	  mechanism:	  They	   can	  only	   access	   their	   beliefs	   about	  how	   the	  world	  can	  back	  up	   the	  artifact’s	   intended	   interaction	  plan.	  Simple	  subjective	  beliefs	  are	  not	  sufficient	  for	  a	  mechanism	  to	  exist,	  however.	  If	  these	  beliefs	  are	  not	  grounded	  in	  some	  way,	  the	  interaction	  plan	  will	  not	  be	  able	  to	  achieve	  its	  results.	  Hence,	  in	  building	   an	   interaction	   plan,	   there	  must	   be	   reasons	   to	   believe	   that	   the	   artifact’s	  mechanism	  in	  fact	  exist	  and	  can	  support	  the	  plan.	  This	   shows	   that	   artifacts	   are	   essentially	   reason-­‐based	   objects.	   As	   Randall	   Dipert	  says,	   “artifacts	   are	   entities	   that	   are	   by	   their	   very	   nature	   disposed	   to	   yielding	  answers	  to	  ‘why’	  questions”	  (Dipert	  1993,	  13).	  This	  rationality	  can	  be	  analyzed	  in	  two	  different	  ways.	  Artifacts	  are	  built	  for	  a	  reason,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  there	  must	  be	  reasons	  for	  believing	  that	  results	  can	  follow	  from	  the	  envisaged	  interaction	  with	  them,	  on	  the	  other.	  I	  will	  call	  the	  first	  kind	  of	  rationality	  teleological	  and	  the	  second	  






appropriately	  embedded	  in	  our	  practices.	  For	  example,	  with	  some	  effort	  we	  could	  perhaps	  build	  an	  artifact	  having	  the	  ability	  to	  count	  the	  number	  of	  leaves	  that	  fall	  from	  a	  tree	  in	  autumn,	  but	  in	  normal	  situations	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  for	  engaging	  in	  such	   an	   enterprise.	   An	   artifact’s	   technical	   rationality	   instead	   has	   to	   do	  with	   the	  reasons	   for	   believing	   that	   its	   interaction	   plan	   can	   in	   fact	   achieve	   the	   intended	  results,	   independently	   of	   our	   evaluation	   of	   the	   relevance	   of	   those	   results.	   Apart	  from	  its	  being	  totally	  pleonastic	  and	  useless,	   the	  artifact	   that	  counts	   fallen	   leaves	  can	   obviously	   also	   fail	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   not	   working	   well,	   or	   not	   being	   able	   to	  effectively	  count	  the	  number	  of	  leaves	  that	  have	  fallen	  from	  a	  tree.	  This	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  coherence	  between	  the	  intended	  interaction	  plan	  and	  its	  objective	  mechanism.	  Now,	   if	   the	  ART	   formula	   is	   intended	   to	   account	   for	   all	   kinds	   of	   artifacts,	   and	   if	   I	  assume	  that	  legal	  institutions	  are	  artifacts,	  I	  should	  give	  a	  description	  of	  how	  ART	  can	   be	   applied	   to	   the	   latter.	   As	   Benoît	   Dubreuil	   has	   explained	   in	   his	   2010	   book	  
Human	  Evolution	  and	  the	  Origins	  of	  Hierarchies,	  legal	  institutions	  began	  to	  emerge	  at	  a	  specific	  moment	  in	  the	  evolutionary	  history	  of	  humankind	  in	  the	  Middle	  Stone	  Age,	  that	  is,	  a	  moment	  in	  which	  the	  temporal	  lobe	  of	  human	  brains	  grew	  larger	  and	  became	   sufficiently	   developed	   to	   use	   recursive	   “meta-­‐representations”	  representing	  the	  meaning	  of	  other	  representations	  (see	  Dubreuil	  2010,	  123–125).	  Among	   these	   meta-­‐representations	   were	   the	   rules	   defining	   proto-­‐legal	   roles	  necessary	  to	  organize	  social	  sanctions	  and	  regulate	  other	  kinds	  of	  social	  exchanges	  in	   the	   context	   of	   enlarged	   traditional	   human	   communities	   (see	   Dubreuil	   2010,	  166–175).	   A	   crucial	   aspect	   of	   this	   “behavioural	   modernization”	   typical	   of	  Homo	  






X	  counts	  as	  Y,	  and	  Y	  has	  status	  function	  (powers	  and	  duties)	  Z.3	  Let	  me	  return	  now	  to	  the	  ART	  formula.	  Given	  that,	   from	  an	  evolutionary	  point	  of	  view,	   legal	   institutions	   seem	   to	  have	   emerged	  when	  meta-­‐representations	   in	   the	  form	  of	  constitutive	  rules	  became	  possible	  and	  symbolic	  artifacts	  were	  developed,	  I	   submit	   that	   the	   best	   way	   to	   conceive	   them	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   ART	   formula	   is	   as	  follows:	  	  LEGAL	  INSTITUTIONS	  as	  IMMATERIAL	  RULE-­‐BASED	  ARTIFACTS	  History	  {Intention-­‐rooted	  Linguistic	  Creation	  Process	  [Interaction	  Plan	  (Mechanism:	  System	  of	  Constitutive	  Rules	  Recognized	  and	  Followed)]}	  According	   to	   this	   explanation,	   legal	   institutions	   in	   the	   first	   place	   have	   an	  immaterial,	  semantic	  aspect:	  They	  consist	  in	  a	  set	  of	  concepts	  specifically	  created	  to	   organize,	   define,	   empower,	   and	   limit	   human	   behaviour	   in	   a	   complex	   social	  setting.	   These	   concepts	   are	  defined	   through	  meta-­‐representations	   in	   the	   form	  of	  constitutive	  rules	  and	  entail	   interaction	  plans	   that	  allow	  individuals	   to	  cope	  with	  the	  relevant	  organization	  and	  social	  structure	  by	  means	  of	  a	  normative	  framework	  that	   empowers	   or	   limits	   them.	   But	   this	   division,	   definition,	   empowerment,	   or	  limitation	  cannot	  gain	  any	  strength	  in	  concrete	  social	  life	  if	  there	  is	  no	  mechanism	  that	  makes	  it	  possible	  for	  them	  to	  obtain	  such	  strength.	  This	  mechanism	  is	  nothing	  other	  than	  actual,	  shared	  recognition	  and	  abidance	  within	  the	  relevant	  community	  with	  the	  system	  of	  constitutive	  rules	  which	  the	  institution	  consists	  of.	  Hence,	  legal	  institutions	   are	   (1)	   immaterial,	   rule-­‐based	   artifacts	   which	   (2)	   consist	   of	   meta-­‐representations	  in	  the	  form	  of	  constitutive	  rules,	  (3)	  entail	  interaction	  plans	  whose	  outcome	   is	   a	   set	   of	   normative	   effects	   (powers,	   rights,	   and	   duties),	   and	   (4)	   are	  based	   on	   actual	   recognition	   and	   rule-­‐following	  within	   a	   given	   social	   community.	  Symbolic	   artifacts,	   such	  as	  ornaments	  or	   signs	  meant	   to	   signify	   social	   status,	   are	  concrete	  artifacts	  that	  find	  their	  meaning	  within	  this	  conceptual	  structure,	  and	  in	  this	  sense	  their	  interaction	  plan	  is	  nested	  within	  a	  broader	  immaterial	  artifact	  (just	  as	  a	  keyboard	  is	  in	  a	  laptop	  in	  the	  previous	  example	  of	  nested	  artifacts).	  An	  empiricist	   reader	  could	   find	   this	  appeal	   to	   “immaterial”	  artifacts	  problematic.	  What	   does	   immaterial	  mean	  here,	   after	   all?	   The	   answer	   should	   be	   quite	   clear	   at	  this	   point:	   By	   immaterial	   artifact	   I	   mean	   an	   artifact	   which	   primarily	   consists	   in	  semantic	   or	   conceptual	   content.	   Legal	   institutions	   are	   not	   alone	   in	   this	   regard:	  Another	   important	   example	   of	   an	   immaterial	   artifact	   is	   that	   of	   literary	   works.	  Although	  works	  of	  literature	  are	  typically	  set	  down	  in	  writing	  and	  thus	  in	  a	  sense	  correspond	  to	  a	  material	  object	  (a	  manuscript),	  literature	  is	  clearly	  not	  a	  collection	  of	   manuscripts.	   The	   first	   consequence	   of	   this	   approach	   is	   that	   an	   immaterial	  artifact	  can	  exist	  in	  different	  material	  forms	  and	  still	  be	  the	  same.	  We	  can	  have	  an	  audio	   book	   of	  Dante’s	   Inferno	   or	  we	   can	   have	   it	   stored	   in	   a	   digital	   file.	  We	  have	  












is	   introduced	   to	   make	   it	   less	   advantageous	   for	   employers	   to	   hire	   on	   flexible	  employment	   contracts—a	   measure	   designed	   to	   encourage	   employers	   to	   offer	  permanent	   positions—the	   newly	   introduced	   institution	   can	   be	   evaluated	   both	  technically	   and	   teleologically;	   that	   is,	   we	   can	   ask	   both	   whether	   the	   purpose	   of	  incentivizing	  permanent	  positions	  is	  economically	  reasonable	  and	  sustainable	  and,	  if	   we	   determine	   that	   it	   is,	   whether	   the	   tax	   is	   appropriately	   designed	   for	   that	  purpose.	   Mark	   Greenberg	   (2004,	   160)	   has	   shown	   how	   the	   constitution	   of	   legal	  content	   on	   the	  basis	   of	   practices	   is	   a	   sort	   of	   “rational	   determination,”	   and	  Leslie	  Green	   (1998,	  121–122)	  has	   clarified	  how,	   in	   judging	   the	   functionality	  of	   law,	  we	  must	   distinguish	   the	   internal	   problem	   of	   how	   legal	   institutions	   perform	   a	   given	  function	  from	  the	  external	  problem	  of	  the	  social	  (and	  moral)	  value	  of	  that	  function.	  This	   is	  exactly	  the	   lesson	  we	  draw	  from	  considering	   legal	   institutions	  as	  artifacts	  according	  to	  the	  ART	  formula.	  	  Consider,	  too,	  the	  concept	  of	  interaction	  plan	  in	  legal	  terms.	  Institutions	  have	  both	  enabling	   and	   disabling	   interaction	   plans.	   If,	   for	   example,	   you	   have	   signed	   a	  contract,	  you	  have	  a	  right	  to	  have	  that	  contract	  performed	  and	  to	  obtain	  what	  you	  have	  agreed	  to.	  But,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	   if	  you	  are	  approaching	  a	  national	  border,	  you	   cannot	   cross	   that	   line	   without	   customs	   inspections	   by	   public	   officials.	   Very	  often	   enabling	   and	   disabling	   plans	   are	   interconnected	   and	   nested	   within	   one	  another.	  For	  example,	  you	  can	  graduate	   from	  the	  University	  of	  Bologna	  and	   thus	  gain	  the	  right	  to	  participate	  in	  an	  open	  competition	  for	  public	  employment,	  among	  other	  things.	  But	  if	  you	  want	  to	  earn	  a	  law	  degree	  at	  the	  same	  university,	  you	  must	  take	  an	  exam	   in	   legal	  philosophy,	  and	   this	  exam	  entails	  specific	  obligations	   in	   its	  own	   turn.	   Institutions	   are	   therefore	   something	   that	   produce	   normative	   effects	  when	   people	   interact	   with	   them	   in	   the	   same	   way	   as	   other	   kinds	   of	   artifacts	  produce	   other	   kinds	   of	   effects.	   Alf	   Ross	   (1957	   (1951))	   has	   famously	  maintained	  that	  the	  connection	  between	  the	  conditions	  for	  the	  subsistence	  of	  legal	  institutions	  and	  the	  normative	  effects	  of	  those	  institutions	  can	  account	  for	  all	  legal	  conceptual	  content.	   Even	   though	   I	   do	   not	   agree	   with	   Ross’s	   reductionism,	   I	   think	   that	   the	  centrality	   of	   conditions	   and	   consequences	   in	   the	   explanation	  of	   legal	   concepts	   is	  entailed	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   legal	   institutions	   are	   artifacts,	   and	   artifacts	   entail	  interaction	  plans	  which	  are	  structured	  precisely	  in	  this	  way.4	  Finally,	   the	  ART	   formula	  can	  perhaps	  add	  a	   few	  elements	   to	  some	  discussions	   in	  legal	  philosophy	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  law	  and	  social	  function.	  Consider,	  for	  example,	  these	  two	  passages	  by	  Brian	  Leiter:	  The	  concept	  of	  law	  is	  the	  concept	  of	  an	  artefact,	  that	  is,	  something	  that	  necessarily	  owes	  its	  












Intended	  functions	  are	  typically	  connected	  with	  authored	  artifacts.	  But	  how	  can	  we	  identify	  latent	  functions,	   if	  any	  exist	  to	  begin	  with?	  I	  agree	  with	  Green	  that	   latent	  functions	   are	   isolated	   with	   reference	   to	   a	   given	   system,	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   the	  function	  must	  have	  “an	   important	  explanatory	  role	   in	  understanding	  the	  political	  and	  economic	   system	  as	   a	  whole,”	   and	   I	   also	  agree	   that	   “it	   is	   sometimes	  hard	   to	  identify	  the	  relevant	  ‘system’	  and	  it	  is	  often	  artificial	  to	  do	  so”	  (Green	  1998,	  118).	  But	  if	  any	  latent	  function	  must	  be	  discovered,	  it	  seems	  evident	  that	  in	  order	  for	  it	  to	   be	   isolated,	   the	   relevant	   legal	   institution	  must	   be	   considered	   in	   its	   historical	  development:	   This	  we	   do	   by	   comparing	   its	   deliberative	   history	  with	   the	   chosen	  system	   of	   reference.	   This	   kind	   of	   comparison	   can	   lead	   to	   a	   sort	   of	   evolutionary	  explanation	   of	   the	   legal	   artifact,	   and	   indeed	   artifacts	   have	   been	   selected	   for	  centuries	   in	   virtue	   of	   their	   practical	   success	   (see	   several	   examples	   in	   (Petroski	  1993)).	  Obviously,	   the	  question	  remains	  whether	  such	  an	  evolutionary	  history	  of	  legal	   institutions	  can	  be	   framed	  without	  engaging	   in	  moral	  evaluation,	  but	   this	   is	  not	  a	  question	  I	  will	  address	  here.	  All	  that	  matters	  for	  my	  purposes	  is	  to	  show	  how,	  by	   framing	   the	   artifactual	   nature	   of	   legal	   institutions	   in	   terms	   of	   deliberative	  history,	  we	  can	  account	  for	  several	  ontological	  issues	  in	  legal	  philosophy	  in	  greater	  detail	  and	  in	  a	  new	  light.	  






followed)]}	  The	  most	   obvious	   example	   of	   a	   legal	   organization	   is	   that	   of	   the	   state.	  We	   know	  from	   constitutional	   law	   that	   the	   state	   is	   characterized	   by	   some	   very	   formal	  features,	   such	  as	  predominance	  and	  permanence,	  but	  apart	   from	  this	   the	  state	   is	  defined	  by	  its	  components,	  namely,	  territory	  and	  an	  authoritative	  structure	  which	  in	  its	  own	  turn	  is	  composed	  by	  a	  set	  of	  rule-­‐defined	  legal	  organizations,	  roles,	  and	  procedures	   (for	   the	   sake	   of	   simplicity,	   I	   am	   referring	   to	   the	   traditional	  constitutional	  doctrine	  of	  the	  state).	  Another	  example	  of	  a	  legal	  organization	  is	  that	  of	  legal	  corporations,	  namely,	  structured	  “collective	  entities”	  which	  have	  a	  capacity	  to	  act	  under	  the	  law,	  are	  endowed	  with	  rights,	  and	  can	  be	  assigned	  specific	  duties.	  Organizations	  first	  of	  all	  entail	  legal	  roles.	  People	  have	  a	  given	  set	  of	  powers,	  rights,	  and	   duties	   connected	   with	   specific	   functions	   that	   they	   must	   serve	   within	   an	  organization.	   A	   role,	   in	   this	   sense,	   is	   connected	   with	   two	   different	   sets	   of	  procedures,	  namely,	   the	  procedures	   that	  must	  be	   followed	   to	   fulfill	   the	   role,	   and	  those	  a	  person	  in	  that	  role	  must	  follow	  in	  order	  to	  produce	  normative	  effects	  if	  the	  role	   is	   connected	   (as	   is	   usually	   the	   case)	   with	   powers.	   Often,	   roles	   are	   also	  connected	  to	  kinds	  of	  legal	  transactions,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  some	  transactions	  can	  be	  carried	  out	  only	  by	  individuals	  who	  fulfill	  a	  certain	  role.	  This	  is	  more	  evident	  if	  we	  include	  in	  the	  concept	  of	  a	   legal	  role	  what	  is	  usually	  called	  a	  legal	  status,	  namely,	  positions	  under	  the	  law	  that	  a	  person	  will	  hold	  under	  certain	  conditions	  and	  that	  in	  their	   own	   turn	   entail	   a	   set	   of	   powers,	   rights,	   and	   duties.	   The	   main	   difference	  between	   a	   role	   and	   a	   status	   under	   the	   law	   is	   that	   fulfilling	   a	   role	   is	   something	  persons	  achieve	  by	  following	  certain	  procedures,	  and	  usually	  entails	  powers,	  while	  being	   in	   a	   status	   can	   simply	   depend	   on	   meeting	   certain	   conditions	   without	  following	   any	   procedure.	   An	   example	   of	   this	   distinction	   is	   that	   between	   being	   a	  king	  and	  being	  a	  legal	  person.	  Being	  a	  king	  is	  a	  role	  we	  can	  fulfill	  only	  after	  having	  followed	   a	   given	   procedure:	   It	   is	   connected	   to	   a	   specific	   function	  within	   a	   given	  organization,	   namely,	   the	   state,	   and	   has	   a	   definite	   set	   of	   powers	   that	   must	   be	  exercised	  within	  a	  more	  or	  less	  strictly	  regulated	  setting.	  By	  contrast,	  being	  a	  legal	  person	   (that	   is,	   being	   a	   subject	   of	   rights	   and	   duties	   under	   a	   legal	   system)	   is	   a	  status,	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   it	   just	   “happens”	   under	   certain	   conditions	   without	  necessarily	   following	   any	   procedure—but	   like	   all	   roles	   it	   entails	   a	   given	   set	   of	  powers,	   rights,	   and	   duties	   under	   the	   law	   and	   can	   be	   connected	   to	   a	   capacity	   to	  perform	  certain	   legal	   transactions	   (in	   fact,	   being	   a	   legal	   person	   is	   a	  conditio	   sine	  












certain	  ordered	  sequence	  of	  actions	  (X),	  you	  are	  part	  of	  procedure	  Y	  and	  hence	  subject	  to	  its	  normative	   outcome	   Z	   (Mechanism:	   Shared	   recognition	   of,	   and	   abidance	   by,	   a	   constitutive	  rule	  in	  the	  form	  “A	  certain	  ordered	  sequence	  of	  actions	  X	  counts	  as	  procedure	  Y	  and	  entails	  normative	  effects	  Z”)]}	  A	  final	  consideration	  must	  be	  made,	  having	  presented	  these	  kinds	  of	  legal	  artifacts.	  It	   is	  apparent	   that,	  apart	   from	  the	  peculiarities	  of	   their	   interaction	  plans	  and	   the	  different	   ways	   in	   which	   they	   can	   interact	   among	   themselves,	   all	   these	   artifacts	  share	   a	   common	   normative	   “grammar,”	   so	   to	   speak:	   They	   are	   all	   constituted	  through	   rules	   and	   all	   in	   some	  way	   entail	   powers,	   rights,	   and	   duties.	   Thus	   these	  concepts—those	  of	  norm,	  power,	  duty,	  and	  rights,	  as	  well	  as	  others	  connected	  with	  them,	  such	  as	  the	  concept	  of	  validity—form	  the	  background	  against	  which	  all	  legal	  institutions,	  conceived	  as	  immaterial	  semantic	  artifacts	  and	  so	  as	  concepts	  in	  their	  own	   turn,	   are	   defined.	   In	   this	   sense,	   these	   concepts	   are	   “meta-­‐institutional,”	  because	  they	  are	  not	  constituted	  by	  the	  rules	  of	  any	  given	  legal	  institution	  but	  are	  inevitably	  presupposed	  by	  them	  (see	  (Miller	  1981,	  188)).	  This	  means	  that	  legal	  artifacts,	  being	  essentially	  semantic	  and	  immaterial	  objects,	  presuppose	   a	   more	   fundamental	   semantics:	   The	   creation	   of	   these	   artifacts	   can	  happen	   only	  within	   a	   social	   practice	  which	   is	   already	   in	   some	   sense	  meaningful	  and	  which	  comes	  with	  its	  own	  set	  of	  meta-­‐institutional	  concepts.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  social	  practice	  we	  call	   law	  must	  at	  a	  minimum	  be	  an	  organization	  of	  powers,	  rights,	   and	  duties	  based	  on	   rules.	   Legal	   artifacts	   are	  necessarily	   inscribed	  within	  this	  general	  social	  practice,	  and	  thus	  they	  are	  constituted	  by	  rules	  which	  determine	  their	  effects	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  relevant	  meta-­‐institutional	  concepts.	  John	  Gardner	  has	  clarified	  as	  follows	  the	  distinction	  between	  legal	  institutions	  as	  artifacts	  and	  law	  as	  a	  social	  practice:	  The	  abstract	  noun	  “law”	  can	  be	  used	  to	  refer	  to	  a	  practice	  as	  well	  as	  genre	  of	  artefacts.	  The	  abstract	  nouns	  “poetry”	  and	  “sculpture”	  have	  the	  same	  ambiguity.	  Sculpture	  is	  the	  genre	  to	  which	   sculptures	  belong	  but	   it	   is	   also	   (differently)	  what	   sculptors	  do.	   Law,	   likewise,	   is	   the	  genre	  to	  which	  legal	  systems	  and	  legal	  norms	  belong	  but	  it	  is	  also	  (differently)	  what	  lawyers	  and	  legal	  officials	  do.	  […	  I]t	  is	  an	  important	  difference.	  A	  practice	  is	  made	  up	  not	  of	  artefacts,	  but	  of	  actions	  and	  activities.	  Many	  practices	  are	  practices	  of	  engaging	  with	  a	   certain,	  often	  eponymous,	  genre	  of	  artefacts.	  (Gardner	  2004,	  174)	  Gardner	  maintains	  that	  law	  is	  a	  genre	  of	  artifact	  other	  than	  a	  social	  practice:	  This	  is	  perfectly	  consistent	  with	  the	  idea	  that	  legal	  institutions	  are	  artifacts	  embedded	  in	  a	  general	   concept	   of	   law	   and	   are	   thus	   constituted	   by	   reference	   to	   a	   specific	   set	   of	  meta-­‐institutional	   concepts.	   This	   general	   concept	   of	   law,	   if	   it	   is	   an	   artifact	   (as	  Leiter,	   for	   one,	   maintains),	   must	   in	   this	   sense	   be	   a	   “deeper”	   artifact	   than	   legal	  institutions.5	  






4. Institutional	  Mimesis	  Thus	   far	   I	  have	  explained	  my	  view	   that	   legal	   institutions	  are	  artifacts	  and	   I	  have	  shown	   how	   this	   view	   can	   have	   a	   significant	   explanatory	   power	   in	   working	   out	  several	   legal-­‐philosophical	  questions.	  I	  turn	  now	  to	  the	  second	  part	  of	  this	  paper,	  where	  I	  show	  how	  law,	  despite	  its	  artifactual	  character,	  can	  also	  be	  “natural”—but	  only	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  not	  being	  easily	  detachable	  from	  our	  conception	  of	  nature.	  To	  this	   end,	   I	  will	   consider	   the	   examples	   so	   far	   given	  when	  discussing	  my	   tentative	  distinction	  among	  four	  different	  kinds	  of	  legal	  artifacts,	  namely:	  Legal	  organizations	  →	  states,	  corporations	  Legal	  roles	  →	  king,	  legal	  person	  Legal	  transactions	  →	  contracts,	  marriages	  Legal	  procedures	  →	  trials	  Let	   me	   start	   with	   states,	   or	   rather,	   with	   what	   is	   usually	   called	   the	   “modern”	  concept	  of	  the	  state.	  It	  is	  a	  quite	  traditional	  view	  in	  legal	  and	  political	  history	  that	  the	   state	   in	   this	   sense	   emerged	   in	   the	   17th	   century	   in	   Europe,	   progressively	  transforming	   the	   multi-­‐centered,	   pluralistic	   legal	   settings	   typical	   of	   the	   Middle	  Ages	   into	   a	   single,	   hierarchical	   organization	   governed	   by	   its	   own	   logic,	   a	   logic	  which	   subsequently	   (after	   the	   French	   Revolution)	   concretized	   into	   the	   legal	  discipline	  we	  now	  call	  “administrative	  law”	  (a	  classical	  statement	  of	  this	  view	  can	  be	  found	  in	  (Weber	  1978,	  chap.	  XI);	  see	  also	  (Fioravanti	  1990,	  sec.	  2)	  for	  a	  critical	  assessment,	  and	  (Mannori	  and	  Sordi	  2009,	  234ff.)	  on	  the	  rise	  of	  administrative	  law	  after	   the	   French	   Revolution).	   Now,	   according	   to	   Stephen	   Toulmin	   in	   his	   famous	  1990	   book	   Cosmopolis,	   the	   rise	   of	   such	   a	   new	   and	   unified	   political	   framework,	  organized	  according	  to	  an	  internal	  rationality	  and	  in	  a	  sense	  universal,	  should	  be	  viewed	  as	  inextricably	  intertwined	  with	  a	  specific	  conception	  of	  the	  natural	  world:	  the	  conception	  encapsulated	  in	  by	  the	  new,	  mathematical	  science	  which	  emerged	  in	   the	   same	   period	   and	   whose	   foremost	   champion	   was	   Isaac	   Newton.	   Writes	  Toulmin:	  Between	   1660	   and	   1720,	   few	   thinkers	  were	   only	   interested	   in	   accounting	   for	  mechanical	  phenomena	  in	  the	  physical	  world.	  For	  most	  people,	  just	  as	  much	  intellectual	  underpinnings	  was	  required	  for	  the	  new	  patterns	  of	  social	  practice,	  and	  associated	  ideas	  about	  the	  polis.	  As	  a	   result,	   enticing	   new	   analogies	   entered	   social	   and	   political	   thought:	   if,	   from	   now	   on,	  “stability”	  was	  the	  chief	  virtue	  of	  social	  organization,	  was	  it	  not	  possible	  to	  organize	  political	  ideas	   about	   Society	   along	   the	   same	   lines	   as	   scientific	   ideas	   about	  Nature?	   (Toulmin	   1992,	  107)	  Elsewhere	  in	  the	  same	  work	  he	  adds:	  	  From	  1700	  on,	   social	   relations	  within	   the	  nation-­‐state	  were	  defined	   in	  horizontal	   terms	  of	  






applied	  to	  their	  wives	  and	  children	  by	  association.	  As	  a	  by-­‐product	  of	  the	  nation-­‐state,	  class	  distinction	  became,	  as	  never	  before,	  the	  crucial	  organizing	  principle	  of	  all	  society.	  In	  France	  especially,	   the	   key	   force	   in	   society	   was	   the	   monarch’s	   “solar”	   power	   to	   control	   (and	  illuminate)	   the	   state’s	   activities.	   […]	   Here,	   the	   planetary	   model	   of	   society	   was	   explicitly	  






One	  should	  distinguish	  between	  those	  cases	  in	  which	  institutional	  mimesis	  is	  only	  a	  way	  to	  legitimize	  or	  interpret	  that	  institution	  ex	  post,	  hence	  without	  having	  any	  role	   in	   its	   creation,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   and	   those	   cases	   in	   which	   we	   can	   at	   least	  hypothesize	   that	   institutional	   mimesis	   actually	   played	   a	   role	   in	   the	   intention-­‐rooted	   creative	  process	   that	   eventually	  produced	   the	  artifact,	   on	   the	  other	  hand.	  Let	  me	  express	   this	  distinction	  by	  means	  of	   the	  dichotomy	  between	  hermeneutic	  and	   genetic	   institutional	   mimesis.6	   It	   is	   difficult	   to	   say	   whether,	   in	   Cosmopolis,	  Toulmin	  had	  in	  mind	  an	  example	  of	  hermeneutic	  or	  genetic	  mimesis.	  Certainly,	  one	  could	  argue	  that	  the	  modern	  conception	  of	  the	  state	  had	  arisen	  in	  virtue	  of	  its	  own	  political	   factors,	   first	   among	  which	   the	   struggle	  between	  absolute	  monarchy	  and	  the	  medieval	  landscape	  of	  scattered	  decision-­‐making	  powers.	  Thus,	  proceeding	  in	  this	  direction,	  it	  would	  be	  easy	  to	  say	  that	  the	  modern	  conception	  of	  science	  simply	  justified	  a	  preexisting	  institutional	  artifact	  that	  was	  emerging	  for	  its	  own	  reasons.	  But	   it	   cannot	   be	   excluded	   that	   this	   ideology	   played	   a	   role	   in	   the	   subsequent	  moulding,	  modification,	   and	   development	   of	   the	   institution	   “state,”	   and	   indeed	   I	  think	   this	   is	   something	   that	   Toulmin	   had	   in	  mind	  when	   he	   wrote	   of	   organizing	  “political	  ideas	  about	  Society	  along	  the	  same	  lines	  as	  scientific	  ideas	  about	  Nature,”	  as	  in	  the	  passage	  quoted	  above.	  	  An	  example	  of	  how	  institutional	  mimesis	  can	  have	  guided	  the	  development	  of	  legal	  conceptions	  about	  the	  state	  and	  thus	  become	  a	  truly	  genetic	  mimesis	  can	  again	  be	  found	   in	   Kelsen.	   Kelsen	   devotes	   some	   attention	   to	   a	   variant	   of	   the	   kind	   of	  institutional	   mimesis	   I	   am	   considering	   in	   regard	   to	   the	   state,	   namely,	   the	   idea	  typical	  of	  organicism,	  traceable	  to	  Thomas	  Hobbes	  and	  later	  defended	  by	  Otto	  von	  Gierke,	  that	  the	  state	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  “macro-­‐anthropos,”	  or	  natural	  organism.	  In	  Kelsen’s	   view,	   this	   idea	   was	   “ideological”	   and	   highly	   problematic,	   because	   its	  primary	  effect	  was	  to	  bring	  about	  the	  conception,	  common	  in	  public	  law,	  that	  the	  state	   is	   something	   which	   precedes	   law	   and	   can	   be	   “justified”	   through	   law.	   As	  Kelsen	  writes	  in	  the	  first	  edition	  of	  his	  1934	  Reine	  Rechtslehre,	  the	   theory	   of	   public	   law	   assumes	   that	   the	   state,	   as	   a	   collective	   unity	   that	   is	   originally	   the	  subject	  of	  will	  and	  of	  action,	  exists	  independently	  of,	  and	  even	  prior	  to,	  the	  law.	  But	  the	  state	  goes	  on	  to	  fulfil	  its	  historic	  mission,	  so	  theory	  has	  it,	  by	  creating	  law,	  ‘its”	  law,	  the	  objective	  legal	  system	  […].	  Thus,	  the	  state—essentially	  metalegal	  in	  character,	  some	  kind	  of	  powerful	  macro-­‐antropos	  or	  social	  organism—is	  a	  presupposition	  of	  the	  law	  and	  is	  at	  the	  same	  time	  a	  legal	   subject	   presupposing	   the	   law	   because	   beholden	   to	   the	   law,	   because	   obligated	   and	  granted	  rights	  by	  the	  law.	  (Kelsen	  1992,	  97)	  In	  my	  terms,	  Kelsen	  is	  arguing	  here	  that	  institutional	  mimesis	  had	  a	  genetic	  role	  in	  the	   development	   of	   public	   law	   doctrines	   during	   the	   19th	   century,	   becoming	   an	  






ideology	  which	  he	   strongly	   rejects.	  Although	   this	   case	  of	   institutional	  mimesis	   is	  not	   exactly	   equivalent	   to	   that	   advocated	   by	   Toulmin	   (the	   state	   is	   described	   by	  Kelsen	  to	  be	  mimetic	  of	  an	  organism,	  and	  not	  of	  cosmic	  order),	  it	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  that,	  in	  doing	  so,	  Kelsen	  tacitly	  presupposes	  precisely	  the	  kind	  of	  institutional	  mimesis	   indicated	   by	  Toulmin,	   namely,	   that	   of	   the	   state	   as	   a	   hierarchic	   order	   in	  which	  everything	   “has	   its	  place,”	  as	  Toulmin	  says.	   In	   this	  passage	   from	  the	  Reine	  
Rechtslehre,	  the	  idea	  is	  icastically	  formulated	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  “division	  of	  labour”:	  The	  state,	  then,	  is	  a	  legal	  system.	  Not	  every	  legal	  system,	  however,	  is	  characterized	  as	  a	  state;	  this	  characterization	  is	  used	  only	  where	  the	  legal	  system	  establishes	  certain	  organs—whose	  respective	   functions	   reflect	   a	   division	   of	   labour—for	   creating	   and	   applying	   the	   norms	  forming	   the	   legal	   system.	   When	   the	   legal	   system	   has	   achieved	   a	   certain	   degree	   of	  centralization,	  it	  characterized	  as	  a	  state.	  (Kelsen	  1992,	  99)	  In	   the	   General	   Theory	   of	   Law	   and	   State,	   of	   1949,	   Kelsen	   also	   equates	   a	   social	  community	  to	  a	  regulated	  order:	  However,	   this	   dualism	   is	   theoretically	   indefensible.	   The	   State	   as	   a	   legal	   community	   is	   not	  something	   apart	   from	   its	   legal	   order	   […].	  A	  number	  of	   individuals	   form	  a	   community	  only	  because	  a	  normative	  order	  regulates	  their	  mutual	  behaviour.	  The	  community	  […]	  consists	  in	  nothing	  but	  the	  normative	  order	  regulating	  their	  mutual	  behaviour.	  (Kelsen	  2006,	  182)	  Kelsen’s	   example	   should	   show	   how	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	   sharply	   distinguish	   cases	   of	  






corporation	   having	   a	   legal	   personality	   separate	   from	   that	   of	   its	   individual	  members	  depended	  on	  its	  being	  considered	  a	  separate	  entity,	  something	  which	  can	  exist	  not	  simply	  as	  a	  mere	  collection	  of	  parts.	  This	  was	  possible	  in	  light	  of	  a	  specific	  distinction	  between	  three	  kinds	  of	  natural	  corpora,	  a	  distinction	  that	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  Stoic	  philosophers	  and	  that	  was	  accepted	  by	  the	  Roman	  jurists.	  According	  to	  this	   distinction,	   which	   is	   clearly	   formulated	   by	   Pomponius	   in	   a	   famous	   passage	  (Digest,	  41,	  3,	  30,	  pr.)	  and	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Seneca	  as	  well,	  there	  are	  three	  kinds	  of	  
corpora	  to	  be	  found	  in	  nature:	  homogeneous	  objects	  of	  a	  given	  species	  whose	  parts	  are	  melted	  together	  and	  have	  no	  separate	  standing,	  for	  example,	  a	  statue;	  objects	  of	  a	  given	  species	  whose	  parts	  have	  their	  own	  separate	  species	  but	  are	  connected	  in	   a	   coherent	   way,	   for	   example,	   a	   ship	   (corpus	   ex	   cohaerentibus);	   and,	   finally,	  objects	  of	  a	  given	  species	  whose	  parts	  have	  their	  own	  separate	  species	  and	  are	  also	  physically	   independent,	   for	   example,	   a	   herd	   of	   sheep	   (corpus	   ex	   distantibus).	  According	  to	  Olivecrona,	  the	  universitates	  discussed	  by	  the	  Roman	  jurists	  were	  to	  be	  conceived	  as	  corpora	  ex	  distantibus:	  As	  corpora	  of	  the	  third	  class	  corporations	  were	  similar	  in	  nature	  to	  other	  corpora	  belonging	  to	  this	  class.	  The	  fundamental	  rules	  concerning	  their	  rights	  and	  duties	  are	  only	  applications	  of	   the	   general	   theory	   of	   corpora.	   The	   essential	   thing	   is	   that	   the	   entity	   is	   a	   corpus,	   distinct	  from	  the	  parts,	  with	  an	   individuality	   that	   remains	  unchanged	  despite	  changes	   in	   the	  parts.	  The	  rules	  are	  inferences	  drawn	  from	  these	  assumptions.	  (Olivecrona	  1949,	  35)7	  As	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Toulmin’s	  hypothesis	  on	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  modern	  state,	  here	  a	  legal	  organization	  is	  created	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  it	  mirrors	  natural	  reality	  according	  to	  a	  common—we	  would	   say	   “scientific,”	   according	   to	   the	   standards	   of	   the	   period—conception	  of	  it:	  The	  classification	  of	  corpora	  refers	  to	  their	  objective	  nature;	  it	  is	  founded	  on	  natural	  science	  without	  consideration	  of	  social	  convenience.	   In	  their	  arguments	  the	  jurists	  assume	  that	  the	  classification	  is	  scientifically	  correct;	  this	  is	  the	  reason	  why	  they	  use	  it	  in	  their	  interpretation	  of	  law.	  (Olivecrona	  1949,	  29)	  This	   is	   therefore	   another	   example	   of	   institutional	   mimesis—and	   of	   genetic	  institutional	  mimesis,	   too,	   because	   it	   is	   not	   possible	   to	   deny	   the	   impact	   that	   the	  Roman	   jurists’	   doctrines	   and	   conceptions	   has	   had	   on	   the	   subsequent	   intention-­‐rooted	  creative	  and	  development	  process	  of	  the	  legal	  artifact	  “corporation”	  in	  the	  European	   context.	   Hence,	   if	   Olivecrona’s	   and	   Toulmin’s	   theses	   are	   correct,	  institutional	  mimesis	  has	  played	  a	  role	  both	  in	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  very	  concept	  of	  a	  legal	  organization	  in	  ancient	  Western	  legal	  thought	  and	  in	  the	  development	  of	  the	  paradigmatic	  case	  of	  a	  legal	  organization	  in	  Western	  public	  law	  of	  the	  modern	  era.	   It	   seems	   safe	   to	   assume	   that	   if	   these	   were	   contingencies,	   they	   were	  






nevertheless	  of	  crucial	  importance	  for	  the	  history	  of	  legal	  thought.	  But	  institutional	  mimesis	  is	  relevant	  to	  other	  kinds	  of	  legal	  artifacts	  as	  well.	  I	  have	  stated	   above	   that	   the	   fundamental	   elements	   of	   legal	   organizations	   are	   roles	  connected	  with	  a	  form	  of	  empowerment.	  Now	  consider	  kingship,	  conceived	  as	  the	  highest	   power	  within	   a	   given	   political	   organization.	   It	   has	   been	   observed	   in	   the	  anthropological	  literature	  that	  in	  many	  cultures	  the	  normative	  powers	  of	  a	  king—in	  essence,	  his	  authority—were	  originally	  connected	  with	  that	  king’s	  actual	  ability	  to	  produce	  effects	  in	  nature.	  James	  George	  Frazer	  provides	  us	  with	  many	  examples	  of	   this	   connection	   in	   the	   chapters	  of	  The	  Golden	  Bough	   devoted	   to	   “magicians	   as	  kings.”	  Consider	  the	  case	  of	  kings	  as	  “rainmakers”	  in	  African	  culture:	  [T]he	   evidence	   for	   the	   evolution	  of	   the	   chief	   out	  of	   the	  magician,	   and	  especially	   out	  of	   the	  rain-­‐maker,	   is	  comparatively	  plentiful.	  Thus	  among	  the	  Wambugwe,	  a	  Bantu	  people	  of	  East	  Africa,	  the	  original	  form	  of	  government	  was	  a	  family	  republic,	  but	  the	  enormous	  power	  of	  the	  sorcerers,	  transmitted	  by	  inheritance,	  soon	  raised	  them	  to	  the	  rank	  of	  petty	  lords	  or	  chiefs.	  Of	  the	  three	  chiefs	   living	  in	  the	  country	  in	  1894	  two	  were	  much	  dreaded	  as	  magicians,	  and	  the	  wealth	   of	   cattle	   they	   possessed	   came	   to	   them	   almost	  wholly	   in	   the	   shape	   of	   presents	  bestowed	  for	  their	  services	  in	  that	  capacity.	  Their	  principal	  art	  was	  that	  of	  rain-­‐making.	  The	  chiefs	   of	   the	  Wataturu,	   another	  people	   of	  East	  Africa,	   are	   said	   to	  be	  nothing	  but	   sorcerers	  destitute	  of	  any	  direct	  political	   influence.	  Again,	  among	  the	  Wagogo	  of	  East	  Africa	  the	  main	  power	  of	   the	   chiefs,	  we	  are	   told,	   is	  derived	   from	   their	   art	  of	   rain-­‐making.	   If	   a	   chief	   cannot	  make	  rain	  himself,	  he	  must	  procure	  it	  from	  some	  one	  who	  can.	  Again,	  among	  the	  tribes	  of	  the	  Upper	  Nile	   the	  medicine-­‐men	  are	  generally	   the	  chiefs.	  Their	  authority	  rests	  above	  all	  upon	  their	  supposed	  power	  of	  making	  rain,	  for	  “rain	  is	  the	  one	  thing	  which	  matters	  to	  the	  people	  in	  those	  districts,	  as	  if	  it	  does	  not	  come	  down	  at	  the	  right	  time	  it	  means	  untold	  hardships	  for	  the	   community.	   It	   is	   therefore	   small	   wonder	   that	   men	   more	   cunning	   than	   their	   fellows	  should	   arrogate	   to	   themselves	   the	   power	   of	   producing	   it,	   or	   that	   having	   gained	   such	   a	  reputation,	  they	  should	  trade	  on	  the	  credulity	  of	  their	  simpler	  neighbours.”	  Hence	  “most	  of	  the	   chiefs	   of	   these	   tribes	   are	   rain-­‐makers,	   and	   enjoy	   a	   popularity	   in	   proportion	   to	   their	  powers	  to	  give	  rain	  to	  their	  people	  at	  the	  proper	  season	  […].”	  The	  Banyoro	  also	  have	  a	  great	  respect	   for	   the	   dispensers	   of	   rain,	   whom	   they	   load	   with	   a	   profusion	   of	   gifts.	   The	   great	  dispenser,	  he	  who	  has	  absolute	  and	  uncontrollable	  power	  over	   the	  rain,	   is	   the	  king	   […].	   In	  Ussukuma,	  a	  great	  district	  on	  the	  southern	  bank	  of	  the	  Victoria	  Nyanza,	  “the	  rain	  and	  locust	  question	  is	  part	  and	  parcel	  of	  the	  Sultan's	  government.	  He,	  too,	  must	  know	  how	  to	  make	  rain	  and	   drive	   away	   the	   locusts.	   If	   he	   and	   his	  medicine-­‐men	   are	   unable	   to	   accomplish	   this,	   his	  whole	   existence	   is	   at	   stake	   in	   times	   of	   distress.	   On	   a	   certain	   occasion,	   when	   the	   rain	   so	  greatly	   desired	   by	   the	   people	   did	   not	   come,	   the	   Sultan	  was	   simply	   driven	   out	   (in	   Ututwa,	  near	   Nassa).	   The	   people,	   in	   fact,	   hold	   that	   rulers	   must	   have	   power	   over	   Nature	   and	   her	  phenomena […].”	  (Frazer	  2009,	  204–209)	  Now,	   even	   though	   Frazer	   regards	   these	   examples	   as	   cases	   of	  magic	   transmuted	  into	  normative	  authority,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  what	  we	  call	  “magic”	  amounts	  to	  nothing	  else	  than	  a	  specific	  conception	  of	  the	  natural	  world	  shared	  within	  those	  cultures.	  So	   here,	   too,	   we	   are	   looking	   at	   an	   example	   of	   institutional	   mimesis,	   because	  rainmakers	   are	   individuals	   whose	   normative	   powers	   (their	   capacity	   to	   produce	  binding	  obligations	  on	  individuals,	  for	  example)	  derive	  from,	  and	  thus	  mirror,	  their	  effective	   ability	   to	   produce	   actual	   effects	   in	   the	   natural	   world.	   This	   mimetic	  connection	  between	  a	  king’s	  normative	  powers	  and	  his	  effective	  capacities	  can	  be	  found	   at	   the	   root	   of	   European	   culture	   as	   well.	   In	   Le	   vocabulaire	   des	   institutions	  






connected	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  executing	  and	  realizing	  and	  signifies	  an	  actual	  effect	  in	  the	  world	  (see	  Benveniste	  1969,	  35).8	  Moreover,	  Pietro	  De	  Francisci	  (1959,	  361ff.)	  has	  described	  in	  great	  detail,	  and	  with	  specific	  reference	  to	  ancient	  Roman	  culture,	  the	  passage	  from	  the	  recognition	  of	  different	  kinds	  of	  actual	  abilities	  (among	  which	  technical	   abilities,	   brute	   force,	   and	   courage)	   to	   the	   attribution	   of	   normative	  powers.	  Clearly,	  such	  an	  ability	  to	  produce	  effects	  in	  the	  natural	  world	  is	  ultimately	  connected	   with	   the	   idea	   that	   kings	   must	   be	   able	   to	   bring	   about	   natural	   effects	  which	  are	  in	  some	  sense	  “good”	  for	  their	  people:	  An	  example	  would	  be	  a	  plentiful	  harvest.	  This	  idea	  is	  almost	  ubiquitous.	  It	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Asian	  culture:	  	  Thus	  the	  ancient	  Hindoo	  law-­‐book	  called	  The	  Laws	  of	  Manu	  describes	  as	  follows	  the	  effects	  of	  a	   good	   king’s	   reign:	   “In	   that	   country	  where	   the	   king	   avoids	   taking	   the	   property	   of	  mortal	  sinners,	   men	   are	   born	   in	   due	   time	   and	   are	   long-­‐lived.	   And	   the	   crops	   of	   the	   husbandmen	  spring	  up,	  each	  as	  it	  was	  sown,	  and	  the	  children	  die	  not,	  and	  no	  misshaped	  offspring	  is	  born.”	  (Frazer	  2009,	  215)	  But	  the	  same	  connection	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  Odyssey,	  XIX,	  110ff.	  (“Your	  fame	  rises	  to	  high	  heaven,	  like	  the	  fame	  of	  a	  peerless	  king,	  who,	  fearing	  the	  gods,	  rules	  many	  brave	  men	  and	  upholds	  the	  law.	  The	  people	  prosper	  under	  his	  leadership,	  and	  the	  dark	  soil	  yields	  wheat	  and	  barley,	  the	  trees	  are	  heavy	  with	  fruit,	  the	  ewes	  never	  fail	  to	   bear,	   and	   the	   sea	   is	   full	   of	   fish”)	   and,	   again	   according	   to	   Benveniste,	   at	   the	  etymological	   roots	  of	   the	  English	  word	   lord,	  which	   is	   thought	   to	  derive	   from	   the	  ancient	  compound	  hlāford,	  whose	  first	  element	  is	  hlaf,	  namely,	  “bread.”	  Hence,	  the	  lord	  would	  be	  “he	  who	  can	  bring	  bread	  to	  his	  people”	  (see	  Benveniste	  1969,	  26–27).	   Moreover,	   as	   Marc	   Bloch	   writes	   in	   his	   1924	   Les	   Rois	   Thaumaturges,	   this	  connection	   eventually	   produced	   the	   idea,	  widely	   shared	   in	   the	  Middle	   Ages	   and	  instrumental	   to	   the	   construction	   of	   kingly	   authority	   in	   Europe,	   that	   “real”	   kings	  must	  have	  thaumaturgical	  powers.	  Bloch	  provides	  us	  with	  an	  accurate	  description	  of	   the	   birth	   and	   death	   of	   this	   idea.	   In	   particular,	   he	   shows	   in	   detail	   how	   the	  supposed	  thaumaturgical	  power	  attributed	  to	  the	  kings	  of	  the	  Capetian	  dynasty	  is	  a	   result	   of	   a	   conceptual	   blending	   between	   the	   ancient	   German	   conception	  according	  to	  which	  kings	  must	  have	  an	  effective	  ability	  to	  manipulate	  nature	  and	  the	  Christian	  translation	  of	   this	   idea	   in	  terms	  of	   the	  king’s	  “holy	  powers,”	  akin	  to	  those	  of	  king-­‐priests	  such	  as	  Melchisedec	  in	  Genesis	  (see	  Bloch	  1961,	  57ff.).	  Kings	  have	  powers	  over	  the	  world;	  hence	  they	  have	  powers	  over	  people:	  They	  can	  control	   the	   natural	   world;	   hence	   they	   have	   the	   normative	   power	   to	   rule.	  Institutional	  mimesis	  seems	  to	  lie	  at	  the	  core	  of	  the	  conceptual	  genesis	  of	  legal	  and	  






political	  authority	   in	  many	  cultures.	   In	  claiming	  that	  this	   is	  a	  kind	  of	   institutional	  mimesis,	  however,	  I	  am	  using	  the	  term	  nature	  in	  a	  slightly	  different	  sense	  from	  the	  one	   used	   above	   when	   speaking	   of	   a	   possible	   mimesis	   between	   institutional	  organizations	  and	  the	  natural	  order	  of	  things:	  There	  I	  was	  speaking	  of	  a	  parallelism	  between	   institutional	   structures	   defined	   through	   constitutive	   rules	   and	  nomological	  generalizations	  about	  nature;	  here	   the	  parallelism	  is	  rather	  between	  normative	   powers	   connected	   to	   a	   given	   role	   and	   the	   ability	   to	   control	   nature.	  


















man’s	  advances.	  Defendant	  Moua	  abducted	  a	  woman	  of	  Laotian	  descent	  from	  the	  Fresno	  City	  College	   campus,	   where	   she	   was	   employed,	   and	   had	   sexual	   relations	   with	   her	   despite	   her	  protests.	   She	   filed	  a	   criminal	   complaint,	   charging	  Moua	  with	  kidnapping	  and	   rape.	  At	   trial,	  Moua	  maintained	   that	   he	   did	   not	   force	   sexual	   relations	   on	   the	   victim	  because	   he	   believed	  that	   her	   protests	   were	   in	   line	   with	   the	   marriage-­‐by-­‐capture	   ritual.	   The	   judge	   accepted	  Moua’s	  claim	  but	  he	  also	  held	  that	  the	  victim	  had	  not	  genuinely	  consented.	  Moua’s	  mistake	  of	  fact	  defense	  was	  successful	  in	  overcoming	  the	  kidnapping	  and	  rape	  charges,	  but	  he	  was	  held	  guilty	  of	  the	  lesser	  offense	  of	  false	  imprisonment.	  (Golding	  2002,	  148)9	  What	   sense	   of	   nature	   is	   at	   work	   in	   this	   example	   of	   institutional	   mimesis?	   I	  previously	   introduced	   a	   distinction	   between	   institutional	   mimesis	   grounded	   in	  nature	   in	  both	  a	   cosmological	   and	  an	  ecological	   sense.	  The	  example	  of	  marriage,	  however,	   does	   not	   quite	   fit	   either	   of	   those	   two	   categories.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   the	  meaning	   of	   nature	   I	   am	   using	   here	   cannot	   be	   traced	   to	   the	   cosmological	   sense,	  because	   in	   this	   case	   institutional	   mimesis	   derives	   a	   normative	   entitlement	   to	  marry	  a	  woman	  from	  a	  man’s	  actual	  ability	  to	  reach	  and	  kidnap	  her:	  It	  is	  not	  simply	  a	  matter	  of	  cosmic	  order,	  but	  of	  what	  humans	  can	  and	  cannot	  do	  in	  a	  brute	  factual	  sense.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  ecological	  sense	  is	  too	  broad	  to	  capture	  the	  specific	  features	   of	   this	   example,	   because	   nature	   is	   conceived	   here	   not	   simply	   as	   the	  context	  in	  which	  human	  beings	  interact	  with	  natural	  phenomena—the	  conception	  at	  work	   in	   the	   case	   of	   kings—but	   as	   the	   context	  where	   they	   interact	  with	   other	  human	  beings	  in	  brutal,	  non-­‐normative	  interactions:	  This	  is,	  in	  other	  words,	  a	  sort	  of	  presocial	  situation	  in	  which	  human	  beings	  are	  conceived	  as	  animals	  governed	  by	  relations	  of	  brute	  force.	  Let	  me	  call	  this	  sense	  of	  nature	  “ethological.”	  In	  considering	  that	   institutional	  mimesis	  can	  be	  grounded	   in	  nature	  conceived	   in	  these	  three	  different	  senses—cosmological,	  ecological,	  and	  ethological—we	  should	  not	  make	  the	  mistake	  of	  thinking	  that	  all	  mimetic	  legal	  transactions,	  because	  they	  involve	  relationships	  among	  humans,	  are	  thereby	  mimetic	  in	  the	  ethological	  sense.	  An	  important	  counterexample	  to	  this	  thesis	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  Roman	  concept	  of	  
promissio,	  an	  ancestor	  of	  our	  concept	  of	  contract.	  A	  promissio	  in	  Roman	  law	  was	  a	  legal	   transaction	   through	  which	  persons	  could	  undertake	  an	  obligation	  under	   ius	  
gentium,	   that	   is,	   even	   if	   they	   were	   not	   Roman	   citizens	   (the	   corresponding	  transaction	  for	  Roman	  citizens	  was	  instead	  the	  sponsio,	  as	  described,	  for	  example,	  by	  Gaius	  in	  Digest	  1,	  3,	  93).	  Now,	   in	  the	  second	  volume	  of	  his	  1941	  Der	  Romische	  
Obligationsbegriff	  (the	  first	  volume	  was	  written	  in	  1927),	  Axel	  Hägerström	  argues	  that	  a	  promissio	  could	  take	  place	  only	  by	  offering	  (literally	  “putting	  forward,”	  pro-­‐
mittere)	  the	  right	  hand,	  which	  had	  to	  be	  accepted	  by	  the	  promisee	  in	  order	  for	  the	  transaction	  to	  be	  validly	  performed.	  In	  his	  view,	  however,	  such	  a	  contact	  between	  right	   hands	   was	   necessary	   for	   the	   transaction	   to	   happen	   because	   some	   sort	   of	  “fluid”	  or	   “force”	  was	   thought	   to	  be	   transmitted	   in	  nature	  upon	  contact,	   and	   this	  force	   in	   a	   sense	   entailed	   a	   communion	   framed	   in	   normative	   terms.	   Writes	  Hägerström:	  	  






In	  the	  dextra	  there	  is	  a	  particular	  internal	  force	  through	  which	  a	  person’s	  objectives	  can	  be	  achieved.	   By	  way	   of	   a	   dextrarum	   iunctio,	   the	   respective	   forces	   are	   supernaturally	  merged	  [vereinigt],	  and	   in	   this	  way	  a	  mystic	  community	   is	  created	   in	  what	  concerns	   the	  sources	  of	  those	   forces.	   Compare	   this	   idea	   with	   the	   primitive	   conceptions	   about	   forces	   enclosed	   in	  external	   objects	  mystically	   transmitted	   by	   physical	   contact	   or	  more	   generally	   by	   external	  contiguity	   [äusseres	   Zusammensein].	   These	   forces	   are	   conceived	   as	   fluida,	   which	   are	  transmitted	   from	   one	   object	   to	   another.	   If	   the	   original	   connection	   has	   been	   organic,	   a	  supernatural	  communion	  of	  destinies	  also	  arises.	  (Hägerström	  1941,	  162;	  my	  translation)10	  As	   already	  noted	  with	   regard	   to	  Frazer,	  what	  Hägerström	   is	   calling	   supernatural	  and	  mystic	  here	  was	  instead	  clearly	  part	  of	  the	  primitive	  conception	  of	  the	  natural	  world	  he	   is	  describing,	  a	  conception	  governed	  by	  animism.	  Thus,	   if	  Hägerström’s	  interpretation	   is	   correct,	   the	   transmission	   of	   rights	   and	   duties	   entailed	   by	   a	  
promissio	  mirrored	  the	  actual	  transmission	  of	  forces	  which	  was	  thought	  to	  happen	  in	  nature	  upon	  contact.	  That	  is	  another	  example	  of	  institutional	  mimesis.	  But	  this	  mimesis	   is	  based	  on	  a	  specific	  dynamic	  of	   forces	  conceived	  as	  part	  of	   the	  natural	  order.	  Thus,	  promissio	  as	  a	  mimetic	   legal	   transaction	  presupposes	  a	  cosmological	  and	  not	  an	  ethological	  sense	  of	  nature,	  despite	  the	   fact	   that	  what	   is	   involved	   in	  a	  
promissio	  is	  a	  relation	  between	  two	  human	  beings.	  Let	   us	   finally	   turn	   to	   legal	   procedures,	   the	   last	   kind	   of	   legal	   artifacts	   previously	  introduced.	  The	  example	  I	  gave	  for	  this	  category	  is	  that	  of	  trials.	  The	  legal	  artifact	  “trial”	   can	   be	   interpreted	   as	   a	   mimetic	   institution	   from	   the	   beginning	   of	   its	  development	   in	  Western	   legal	   culture.	  More	   to	   the	  point,	   at	   the	  origin	  of	  Roman	  law	   some	   trial	   procedures	   seem	   to	   mirror	   brutal	   fights	   decided	   by	   the	   gods.	  Consider	   in	   this	   regard	   the	   role	   of	   force	   in	   the	   legis	   actiones,	   by	   which	   the	  defendant	  who	  was	  unwilling	  to	  go	  to	  court	  had	  to	  be	  forced	  by	  the	  plaintiff	  for	  the	  trial	  to	  begin	  (see	  in	  this	  regard	  (Dalla	  and	  Lambertini	  1996,	  144ff.)).	  What	  seems	  striking,	   however—and	   indeed	   this	   is	   another	   clue	   to	   the	   relevance	   that	  institutional	  mimesis	  can	  have	  not	  only	  in	  legal	  history	  but	  also	  in	  legal	  theory—is	  that	   trials	   can	  be	   interpreted	   as	  mimetic	   even	   in	   the	   contemporary	   legal	   setting.	  Here	  I	  will	  make	  an	  example	  drawn	  from	  the	  current	  debate	  on	  constitutional	  law	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  namely,	  the	  idea	  of	  one’s	  “standing”	  before	  a	  court.	  This	  idea,	  which	   incidentally	   many	   parallels	   in	   other	   legal	   cultures	   (l’interesse	   ad	   agire	   in	  Italy	  and	  die	  Klagebefugnis	  in	  Germany,	  among	  others),	  means	  that	  the	  plaintiff	  in	  a	  lawsuit	  must	  be	  able	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  he	  or	  she	  has	  a	  sufficiently	  concrete	  and	  personal	   interest	   in	  a	  dispute	  as	  a	  formal	  condition	  for	  being	  entitled	  to	  have	  the	  courts	   decide	   the	  merits	   of	   that	   dispute.	  Now,	   according	   to	   Steven	  Winter	   in	   his	  pioneering	   1988	   article	   “The	   Metaphor	   of	   Standing	   and	   the	   Problem	   of	   Self-­‐Governance,”	   this	   idea	   is	   essentially	   metaphoric:	   It	   basically	   evokes	   the	   several	  common	  meanings	  of	  “standing”	  by	  which	  we	  can	  describe	  an	  individual’s	  ordinary	  behaviour:	  The	  metaphor	   of	   “standing”	   is	   a	  myth	   that	   has	   become	   “the	   literal	   truth”	   and	   shaped—or	  






misshaped—our	  thinking	  about	  adjudication.	  It	  has	  shaped	  our	  thinking	  about	  adjudication	  to	  conform	  to	  two	  separate	  “truths”	  embedded	  in	  the	  metaphor,	  and	  to	  think	  about	  them	  as	  one.	   The	   first	   is	   the	   “truth”	   of	   individualism:	  One	   stands	   alone;	   one	   stands	   up;	   one	   stands	  apart;	   one	   stands	   out;	   one	   stands	   head	   and	   shoulders	   above	   the	   crowd.	   […]	   The	   second	  “truth”	   embodied	   in	   the	   metaphor	   is	   that	   the	   individual	   must	   have	   a	   particular	   kind	   of	  relationship	   to	   the	   court	   whose	   power	   he	   or	   she	   is	   seeking	   to	   invoke:	   A	   court	   will	   only	  consider	  what	  a	  party	  has	  to	  say	  if	  he	  or	  she	  is	  standing	  (read:	  has	  “standing”).	  (Winter	  1988,	  1387-­‐8)	  This	  is,	  again,	  a	  sort	  of	  institutional	  mimesis—and	  a	  performative	  one	  in	  particular.	  Indeed,	  on	  this	  interpretation,	  one	  of	  the	  conditions	  for	  accessing	  the	  legal	  artifact	  “trial”	   in	   the	   United	   States	   tacitly	   mirrors	   the	   way	   in	   which	   we	   can	   “stand”	   in	  ordinary	   life.	  And	   this	   gives	   rise	   to	  what	  Winter	   calls	   a	   “private-­‐rights”	  model	  of	  procedural	  justice,	  which	  in	  its	  own	  turn	  is	  metaphoric:	  Modern	   standing	   law	   defines	   this	   relationship	   between	   the	   individual	   and	   the	   process	   in	  terms	  of	  a	  particular	  cognitive	  model:	  the	  private	  rights	  model.	  We	  structure	  this	  model	  by	  means	   of	   two	  metaphors	   premised	   on	   the	   source-­‐path-­‐goal	   schema:	   a	   causal	   source-­‐path-­‐goal	  metaphor	  and	  a	  remedial	  source-­‐path-­‐goal	  metaphor.	  We	  identify	  the	  subject	  matter	  of	  a	   lawsuit	  through	  the	  elements	  of	  the	  causal	  schema.	  The	  defendant’s	  act	   is	   the	  source,	   the	  causal	  chain	  is	  the	  path,	  and	  the	  plaintiff’s	  injury	  is	  the	  goal.	  The	  remedial	  source-­‐path-­‐goal	  metaphor	  is	  virtually	  a	  mirror	  image	  of	  the	  causal	  one:	  The	  individual’s	  injury	  is	  the	  source	  of	  a	  process	   that	  has	  as	   its	  goal	   an	  order	   from	   the	  court	   redressing	   that	   injury;	   the	  path	   that	  connects	   them	   is	   the	  plaintiff’s	   proof	   that	   the	   acts	   of	   the	  defendant	   caused	   the	   injury.	  The	  mirror	  image	  quality	  of	  these	  two	  source-­‐path-­‐goal	  metaphors	  gives	  rise	  to	  the	  conception	  of	  damages	   and	   other	   forms	   of	   legal	   redress	   as	   designed	   “to	   put	   the	   plaintiff	   back	   in	   the	  position	  he	  occupied”	  (or	  as	  near	  as	  possible)	  before	  occurrence	  of	  the	  legal	  wrong.	  (Winter	  1988,	  1388)	  Another	  metaphor	   thus	   emerges	  here:	   the	   idea	   that	   a	   legal	   trial	  mimics	   a	   causal	  chain	   having	   a	   source,	   a	   path,	   and	   a	   goal.11	  While	   the	   previous	  mimesis,	   that	   of	  standing,	  was	  performative	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  involved	  only	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  a	  case	  could	  be	  decided	  by	  a	  given	  court,	  according	  to	  this	  “private-­‐rights”	  model	   the	   whole	   structure	   of	   the	   legal	   artifact	   is	   conceived	   as	   being	   essentially	  mimetic,	  thus	  involving	  both	  performative	  and	  normative	  mimesis.	  And	  while	  the	  metaphor	  of	  “standing”	  mirrored	  a	  person’s	  actual	  ability	  (the	  ability	  to	  stand	  up	  or	  stand	  apart)	  by	  means	  of	  a	  normative	  entitlement	  (the	  right	  to	  have	  his	  or	  her	  case	  decided	  by	  a	  court),	  thus	  presupposing	  an	  ecological	  sense	  of	  nature,	  the	  “private	  rights”	  model	  is	  described	  here	  to	  mirror	  the	  very	  structure	  of	  causal	  connections	  in	   nature	   or	   in	   human	   behaviour	   oriented	   toward	   a	   goal,	   thus	   presupposing	   a	  cosmological	  conception:	  In	  Winter’s	  words,	  “[o]ur	  use	  of	  the	  causal	  source-­‐path-­‐goal	  metaphor	  to	  conceptualize	  the	  subject	  matter	  of	  a	   lawsuit	  overlaps	  with	  our	  use	   of	   source-­‐path-­‐goal	   metaphors	   to	   structure	   our	   view	   of	   both	   purposes	   and	  causation”	   (Winter	   1988,	   1390).	   And	   this	   complex	   example	   of	   institutional	  mimesis	   has	   far-­‐reaching	   consequences	   on	   the	   way	   in	   which	   the	   scope	   of	   the	  






judicial	  process	  is	  thought	  of	  and	  described	  in	  current	  American	  legal	  doctrine.	  With	   the	   “standing”	  metaphor	   I	   have	   concluded	  my	   presentation	   of	   examples	   of	  institutional	  mimesis.12	   All	   the	   kinds	   of	   legal	   artifacts	   introduced	   in	   Section	   3—legal	  organizations,	  roles,	  transactions,	  and	  procedures—have	  been	  discussed	  with	  reference	   to	   some	   of	   examples.	   Let	  me	   now	  provide	   some	   conjectures	   on	   how	   I	  think	  these	  phenomena	  can	  be	  explained.	  	  
5. Institutional	  Mimesis	  as	  Metaphoric	  Conceptual	  Blending	  Winter’s	  example	  of	  “standing”	  discussed	  in	  the	  last	  section	  is	  not	  so	  different	  from	  the	  examples	  of	  the	  state	  and	  of	  legal	  personality	  critically	  discussed	  by	  Kelsen.	  In	  both	   cases	   we	   face	   a	   crucial	   problem	   in	   legal	   doctrine,	   and	   in	   both	   cases	   the	  interpretation	  of	  a	  crucial	  legal	  artifact	  is	  mediated	  by	  an	  underlying	  description	  of	  the	   factual	  world,	   namely,	   it	   is	   an	   instance	   of	   institutional	  mimesis.	   Despite	   this	  similarity,	   however,	  Winter	  makes	   an	   important	   statement	   that	   Kelsen	   does	   not	  make,	   at	   least	  not	   explicitly.	  He	  writes:	   “My	  view	   is	  premised	  on	   the	   recognition	  that	  the	  use	  of	  a	  particular	  cognitive	  model	  has	  ontological	  effects	  in	  the	  real	  world”	  (Winter	  1987,	  1389;	  emphasis	  added).	  And	  in	  another	  passage	  he	  adds:	  	  New	  metaphors,	   like	  conventional	  metaphors,	  can	  have	  the	  power	  to	  define	  reality.	  They	  do	  this	   through	  a	   coherent	  network	  of	  entailments	   that	  highlight	   some	   features	  of	   reality	  and	  hide	  others.	  The	  acceptance	  of	  the	  metaphor,	  which	  leads	  us	  to	  focus	  only	  on	  those	  aspects	  of	  our	  experience	  that	  it	  highlights,	  forces	  us	  to	  view	  the	  entailments	  of	  the	  metaphor	  as	  being	  true.	  (Winter	  1987,	  1458;	  emphasis	  added)	  But	  how	  can	  that	  be	  so?	  How	  can	  a	  cognitive	  model	  have	  an	  ontological	  bearing?	  Even	  if	  it	  is	  true	  that	  a	  metaphor	  “selects,”	  as	  it	  were,	  what	  we	  see	  as	  relevant	  and	  what	  we	  dismiss	  as	  irrelevant,	  we	  need	  another	  premise	  to	  show	  that	  this	  feature	  of	  our	  thinking	  can	  become	  a	  feature	  of	  legal	  reality.	  This	  premise	  is	  precisely	  that	  legal	  institutions	  are	  artifacts.13	  Since	  in	  the	  artifactual	  domain	  the	  history	  relevant	  in	  assessing	  an	  artifact’s	  reality	  is	  a	  deliberative	  history	  (see	  Section	  2	  above),	  all	  development	   processes	   have	   an	   inherently	   interpretive	   nature:	   You	   have	   to	  possess	  a	  concept	  of	  what	  the	  artifact	  is	  for	  in	  order	  to	  reproduce	  that	  artifact,	  and	  






very	   often	   the	   possession	   of	   such	   a	   concept	   is	   the	   outcome	   of	   an	   interpretive	  enterprise.	   This	   is	   even	   more	   so	   with	   legal	   artifacts.	   In	   this	   case,	   legal	  interpretation	  and	  reinterpretation	  clearly	  dictates	  how	  the	  artifact	  is	  reproduced,	  just	   as	   it	   dictates	   the	   development	   of	   its	   interaction	   plan	   and	   of	   its	   underlying	  constitutive	   rules.	   In	  moulding	   the	  way	   in	  which	  human	  beings	   conceive	   a	   given	  legal	  artifact	  by	  way	  of	  a	  mimetic	  relation	  with	  an	  underlying	  conception	  of	  nature,	  institutional	  mimesis	  therefore	  has	  an	  ontological	  bearing.	  Given	  that	  an	  artifact’s	  ontology	  traces	  back	  to	  an	  intention-­‐rooted	  process	  of	  creation	  and	  development,	  if	   institutional	   mimesis	   can	   influence	   that	   process,	   it	   eventually	   dictates	   that	  artifact’s	   peculiar	   reality.	   The	   artifact	   is	   created	   having	   that	  model	   in	  mind	   and	  thus	  takes	  on	  the	  features	  of	  that	  model.	  The	  main	  consequence	  of	  this	  argument	   is	  that	   legal	  artifacts	  can	  have	  a	  mimetic	  ontology,	   namely,	   that	   if	  we	   conceptualize	   them	   in	  mimetic	   terms,	   then	   they	   are	  mimetic	   objects.	   And	   this	   in	   turn	   implies	   that,	   in	   several	   important	   cases,	   the	  construction	   of	   our	   legal	   normative	   artifacts	   is	   inherently	   linked	   to	   the	  way	  we	  describe	  our	  factual	  world,	  be	  it	  the	  order	  of	  nature	  in	  general	  or	  the	  way	  in	  which	  human	  beings	  can	  manipulate	  their	  natural	  context	  (including	  other	  human	  beings:	  recall	   the	   distinction	   previously	   made	   between	   three	   different	   conceptions	   of	  nature).	   This	   seems	   to	   be	   a	   very	   counterintuitive	   conclusion.	   After	   all,	   highly	  conventional	   and	   formalized	   legal	   artifacts	   are	   commonly	   introduced	   in	   a	   given	  legal	   system	   by	   way	   of	   legislation	   and	   can	   hardly	   be	   described	   as	   having	   any	  relationship	  with	  our	  pre-­‐normative	   conception	  of	  nature	   and	  of	  brute	   facts.	  We	  tend	  to	  think	  about	  the	  law	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  solution	  to	  social	  problems,	  and	  there	  is	  nothing	  in	  this	  concept	  that	  dictates	  a	  more	  or	  less	  strict	  connection	  to	  the	  natural	  setting	  we	  live	  in.	  We	  are	  so	  accustomed	  to	  thinking	  of	  law	  as	  something	  artificial	  that	  we	  do	  not	  see	  how	  that	  artifact	  could	  be	  natural	   in	  any	  sense.	   In	  contrast	   to	  this	   ordinary	   conception,	   I	   maintain	   that	   although	   not	   every	   legal	   institution	   is	  necessarily	   an	   outcome	   of	   institutional	   mimesis,	   this	   phenomenon	   nevertheless	  plays	  a	  very	  important	  role	  in	  law,	  and	  this	  for	  reasons	  having	  to	  do	  with	  the	  way	  we	  conceptualize	  immaterial	  artifacts.	  We	  have	  seen	  that,	  when	  Winter	  discusses	  the	  concept	  of	  “standing”	  in	  the	  current	  American	  debate	  on	  procedural	  justice,	  he	  speaks	  of	  metaphor.	  Metaphor	  is	  a	  sort	  of	   symbolic	   relation	  which	   links	   something	   to	   something	   entirely	   different.	   And	  indeed	   institutional	   mimesis	   is	   a	   sort	   of	   metaphoric	   relation	   between	   the	  constitutive	   rules	   of	   a	   given	   legal	   artifact	   and	   some	   general	   statement	   about	  natural	  or	  factual	  regularities.	  Hence,	  for	  example,	  the	  connection	  between	  a	  king’s	  normative	  powers,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  the	  corresponding	  human	  being’s	  actual	  abilities,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  can	  indeed	  be	  seen	  as	  metaphoric.	  In	  this	  view,	  what	  I	  am	  normatively	  empowered	  to	  do	  is	  made	  to	  depend	  metaphorically	  on	  what	  I	  can	  






conceptualize	   abstract	   things	   in	   a	   given	  domain	  by	  means	  of	   other,	   less	   abstract	  things	  in	  other	  domains.	  Writes	  George	  Lakoff	  in	  his	  1996	  Moral	  Politics:	  A	   conceptual	  metaphor	   is	   a	   correspondence	  between	  concepts	   across	   conceptual	  domains,	  allowing	  forms	  of	  reasoning	  and	  words	  from	  one	  domain	  […]	  to	  be	  used	  in	  the	  other	  […].	  It	  is	  extremely	  common	  for	  such	  metaphors	  to	  be	  fixed	  in	  our	  conceptual	  systems,	  and	  thousands	  of	  such	  metaphors	  contribute	  to	  our	  everyday	  modes	  of	  thought.	  For	  the	  most	  part,	  we	  use	  them	  without	  effort	  or	  conscious	  awareness.	  Yet,	  as	  we	  shall	  see,	  they	  play	  an	  enormous	  role	  in	  characterizing	  our	  worldviews.	  (Lakoff	  1996,	  chap.	  4)	  In	  the	  1980	  Metaphors	  We	  Live	  By,	  George	  Lakoff	  and	  Mark	  Johnson	  draw	  on	  the	  theory	  of	  the	  “embodied	  mind”	  to	  argue	  that	  this	  mechanism	  of	  conceptualization	  through	  metaphors	  proceeds	  from	  the	  concrete	  to	  the	  abstract,	  from	  the	  domain	  of	  the	  physical	  to	  that	  of	  immaterial	  things.	  This	  typical	  direction	  of	  metaphorization	  they	  call	  “grounding”:	  “what	  we	  are	  claiming	  about	  grounding	  is	  that	  we	  typically	  conceptualize	  the	  nonphysical	   in	  terms	  of	   the	  physical—that	   is,	  we	  conceptualize	  the	   less	   clearly	   delineated	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   more	   clearly	   delineated”	   (Lakoff	   and	  Johnson	  2003,	  59).	  As	  Johnson	  writes	  in	  another	  work:	  There	   is	  a	   logic	  of	  our	  bodily	  experience	   that	   is	   imaginatively	  appropriated	   in	  defining	  our	  abstract	  concepts	  and	  reasoning	  with	  them.	  Imaginative	  processes	  of	  this	  sort	  depend	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  our	  bodies,	  our	  brains,	  and	  the	  patterns	  of	  our	  interactions	  with	  our	  environment.	  (Johnson	  2007,	  846)	  This	  concept	  of	  grounding	  is	  clearly	  crucial	  to	  institutional	  mimesis,	  particularly	  in	  those	  cases	  where	  the	  underlying	  concept	  of	  nature	  is	  ecological	  or	  ethological.	  But	  it	   is	   striking	   to	   note	   that	   grounding	   can	   be	   relevant	   not	   only	   in	   connection	  with	  specific	  institutional	  legal	  structures	  but	  also	  with	  the	  meta-­‐institutional	  concepts	  which	  are	  essential	  to	  the	  practice	  of	  law	  in	  general:	  the	  concepts	  of	  power,	  rights,	  duty,	  and	  rule	   (recall	   the	  distinction	  between	   institutional	  and	  meta-­‐institutional	  concepts	  made	  in	  Section	  2).	   In	  the	  1988	  article	  Force	  Dynamics	   in	  Language	  and	  
Cognition,	   Leonard	  Talmy	  proposes	   an	  analysis	   of	   basic	  deontic	   terms	   in	  English	  (terms	  such	  as	  may,	  must,	  and	  can,	  corresponding	  to	  deontic	  permission,	  duty,	  and	  power)	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  what	  he	  calls	  a	  “force	  dynamics,”	  namely,	  a	  question	  of	  “how	  entities	  interact	  with	  respect	  to	  force”:	  Included	  here	   is	   the	  exertion	  of	   force,	   resistance	   to	   such	  a	   force,	   the	  overcoming	  of	   such	  a	  resistance,	  blockage	  of	   the	  expression	  of	   force,	   removal	  of	   such	  blockage,	   and	   the	   like.	   […]	  Though	   modals	   have	   been	   investigated	   from	   many	   perspectives,	   there	   has	   been	   general	  inattention	   to	  what	   appears	   to	   lie	   at	   the	   core	   of	   their	  meanings,	   namely,	   force	   opposition.	  (Talmy	  1988,	  49,	  77)	  Some	  of	  Talmy’s	  ideas	  are	  quite	  effectively	  discussed	  and	  summarized	  in	  chapter	  3	  of	   Eve	   Sweetser’s	   1990	   book	   From	   Etimology	   to	   Pragmatics:	   Metaphorical	   and	  
Cultural	  Aspects	   of	   Semantic	   Structure.	  Here	  are	   some	  passages	   in	  her	  discussion	  which	  are	  quite	  relevant	  for	  my	  purposes:	  






not”)	   in	   terms	  of	   the	  more	  general	   concepts	  of	   forces	   and	  barriers.	  Must	   is	   equally	   readily	  understood	   as	   a	   compelling	   force	   directing	   the	   subject	   towards	   an	   act.	   […]	   The	   closest	  physical	  analogy	  to	  can	  would	  be	  potential	   force	  or	  energy	  […]	  and	  perhaps	  the	  best	   force-­‐dynamic	   characterization	   I	   can	   give	   for	   ability	   is	   to	   say	   that	   it	   is	   the	   human	   and	   social	  modality	  in	  terms	  of	  which	  we	  view	  potential	  energy	  in	  physics.	  (Sweetser	  1990,	  52–53)	  Here	   we	   are	   looking	   at	   meta-­‐institutional	   mimesis	   as	   distinguished	   from	  institutional	   mimesis,	   and	   it	   seems	   that	   there	   is	   a	   sort	   of	   logical	   priority	   of	   the	  former	   over	   the	   latter.	   In	   this	   light,	   some	   the	   specific	   examples	   of	   mimesis	  previously	  discussed—the	  power	  of	  kings	  as	  mimetic	  of	   their	  actual	  abilities,	   the	  obligations	  connected	  with	  marriage	  as	  mimetic	  of	  brutal	  kidnap—must	  be	  viewed	  as	  specific	  formulations	  of	  a	  general	  metaphoric	  dependence	  of	  the	  modals	  can	  and	  
must	   on	   factual	   barriers,	   that	   is,	   we	   have	   to	   do	   with	   removed	   or	   imposed	  constraints	  on	  actions	  and	  motions.14	  The	   relevant	   question	   now	   becomes	   whether,	   in	   providing	   an	   account	   of	   these	  phenomena	   in	   terms	   of	   conceptual	   metaphors,	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   connect	  institutional	  and	  meta-­‐institutional	  mimesis	  in	  a	  convincing	  way,	  so	  as	  to	  provide	  a	  unified	   cognitive	   model	   grounding	   the	   theory	   of	   legal	   institutions	   as	   mimetic	  artifacts.	  My	  conjecture	  is	  that	  this	  can	  be	  done	  in	  terms	  of	  another	  concept	  widely	  used	   in	   contemporary	   cognitive	   psychology,	   that	   of	   “conceptual	   blending”	   or	  “conceptual	  integration.”	  In	  their	  The	  Way	  We	  Think:	  Conceptual	  Blending	  and	  the	  
Mind’s	  Hidden	  Complexities,	  of	  2002,	  Gilles	  Fauconnier	  and	  Mark	  Turner	  elaborate	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  conceptual	  metaphors	  by	  showing	  more	  in	  general	  how	  conceptual	  structures	   can	   result	   from	   a	   “blend”	   between	   different	   conceptual	   domains.	   In	  conceptual	  blending,	  two	  or	  more	  input	  “mental	  spaces”	  that	  contain	  elements	  and	  are	   structured	   in	   frames	   can,	   in	   virtue	   of	   a	   structural	   similarity	   between	   these	  frames,	  be	  connected	  by	  way	  of	  a	  more	  or	  less	  arbitrary	  correspondence	  relation.	  


















I	  leave	  it	  to	  the	  reader	  to	  reconstruct	  the	  other	  examples.15	  
6. Final	  Remarks	  I	  would	  summarize	   the	  conclusion	  of	   this	  paper	  as	   follows:	  Legal	   institutions	  are	  artifacts,	   but	   they	   can	   seem	   to	   a	   certain	   extent	   “natural”	   when	   they	   are	   the	  outcome	  of	  metaphoric	  conceptual	  blending	  between	  some	  description	  of	  natural	  reality	   and	   a	   set	   of	   meta-­‐institutional	   concepts	   which	   are	   in	   their	   own	   turn	  metaphoric	  of	  facts.	  Indeed,	  several	  legal	  artifacts	  of	  crucial	  importance	  to	  Western	  legal	   thought	  have	  been	  or	  are	   still	  mimetic	   in	   this	   sense.	  Thus,	  a	   theory	  of	   legal	  institutions	   as	   artifacts	   connected	   to	   a	   theory	   of	   institutional	   mimesis	   can	   shed	  some	   light	   on	   the	   problem	   of	   the	   relation	   between	  what	   is	   natural	   and	  what	   is	  artificial	  in	  law,	  a	  problem	  which	  is	  among	  the	  most	  traditional	  and	  longstanding	  in	  legal	  philosophy.	  Indeed,	   one	   of	   the	   curious	   effects	   of	   institutional	  mimesis	   is	   that	   it	   forces	   us	   to	  consider	   law	   in	   a	   new	   light	   precisely	   because	   we	   have	   become	   accustomed	   to	  thinking	   of	   law	   as	   something	   separate	   from	   our	   conception	   of	   nature.	   Even	  contemporary	  natural	   law	  theory	  does	  not	  ground	  natural	   law	  in	  any	  description	  of	   nature,	   at	   least	   not	   in	   the	   cosmological,	   ecological,	   or	   ethological	   senses	   of	  
nature	  previously	  considered.	  As	  mentioned,	  we	  tend	  to	  view	  law	  as	  a	  conventional	  way	  to	  deal	  with	  social	  problems	  or	  as	  a	  social	  custom	  that	  has	  a	  strictly	  regulative	  purpose,	   not	   as	   something	   that	   can	  mirror	   the	  way	   in	  which	  we	   think	  about	   the	  nonsocial,	   or	   presocial,	   world.	   But	   if	   it	   is	   true	   that	   many	   longstanding	   legal	  institutions	  have	  a	  mimetic	  origin	  and	  that	  mimetic	  assumptions	  can	  be	  found	  even	  at	   the	  heart	  of	   contemporary	   legal	  doctrine,	  we	  cannot	  still	   consider	   the	  relation	  between	   the	   structure	   of	   legal	   institutions	   and	   that	   of	   natural	   regularities	   as	  irrelevant.	   It	   rather	   becomes	   a	   fundamental	   question	   whether	   the	   common	  conceptualization	   of	   a	   given	   legal	   artifact,	   and	   hence	   its	   ontology,	   is	   based	   on	  mimetic	  grounds.	  That	  question	   is	   fundamental	  because	   this	  kind	  of	   institutional	  mimesis	   can	   form	  hidden,	   tacit	   assumptions	   in	   the	  way	  an	  artifact	   is	   interpreted	  and	  reproduced:	  It	  can	  lie	  at	  the	  very	  core	  of	  legal	  reality.	  This	  does	  not	  mean	   that	  what	   I	   am	  advocating	  here	   is	   a	   revival	   of	   a	  natural	   law	  theory.	  Certainly,	  my	  conclusion	  should	  be	  of	  interest	  to	  natural	  law	  theorists,	  even	  though	   the	   assumption	   that	   all	   legal	   institutions	   are	   artifacts	   seems	   to	   lie	   at	   the	  other	  end	  of	  the	  legal-­‐philosophical	  spectrum,	  opposite	  to	  natural	  law	  theory.	  It	  is	  important	   to	   stress,	   however,	   that	   I	   am	  not	   drawing	   any	  prescriptive	   conclusion	  from	   phenomena	   of	   institutional	  mimesis.	   In	   other	  words,	   I	   am	   not	  maintaining	  that	  on	  the	  premise	  that	  several	  crucial	  legal	  institutions	  can	  be	  conceptualized	  by	  reference	   to	   some	   description	   of	   natural	   regularities,	   then	  we	   can	   conclude	   that	  






these	   institutions	   are	   in	   some	   sense	   morally	   justified.	   An	   inference	   of	   that	   sort	  would	  require	  a	   further,	  axiological	  assumption	  about	  the	   inherent	  “goodness”	  of	  nature.	  Rather,	  I	  am	  taking	  the	  descriptive	  assumption	  at	  the	  core	  of	  some	  versions	  of	   natural	   law	   theory	   (think	   of	   the	   cosmic	   order	   conceived	   as	   logos	   in	   ancient	  Stoicism);	  I	  am	  casting	  it	  in	  a	  weaker	  form	  (I	  speak	  not	  of	  “nature	  in	  itself”	  but	  of	  our	  a	  culturally	  shaped	  description	  of	  natural	  regularities);	  and	  I	  am	  reframing	  this	  assumption	   within	   a	   theory	   of	   law	   as	   an	   artifact.	   Thus,	   in	   a	   sense,	   institutional	  mimesis	  could	  be	  said	  to	  lie	  at	  the	  core	  of	  a	  descriptive	  natural	  law	  theory,	  but	  only	  in	  a	  very	  weak	  sense.	  Conversely,	   one	   could	   argue	   that	   my	   insistence	   on	   conceptualization	   as	   a	  fundamental	   ground	   for	   the	   construction	   of	   mimetic	   legal	   artifacts	   leads	   me	   to	  essentially	  embrace	  a	   sort	  of	  psychologistic	   legal	   realism.	   Indeed,	   I	  would	  not	  be	  alone	  on	  this	  path.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  several	  metaphoric	  phenomena	  at	  the	  core	  of	  fundamental	   legal	   concepts	   have	   been	   pointed	   out	   by	   legal	   realists	   like	   Axel	  Hägerström	   and	  Karl	   Olivecrona,	   and	   the	   same	   has	   been	   done	  more	   recently	   by	  Edoardo	  Fittipaldi	   in	  his	  2012	  Everyday	  Legal	  Ontology,	  a	  book	  which	  takes	  Leon	  Petrazycki’s	  psychologistic	  theory	  of	  law	  as	  its	  fundamental	  framework.16	  Fittipaldi	  reconstructs	   several	   assumptions	   behind	  what	   he	   calls	   “naïve	   legal	   ontology”	   in	  terms	  of	   the	   following	  “general	  conjecture”:	   “a	  belief	   in	   the	  existence	  of	  a	  certain	  legal	   reality	   emerges	  when	  a	   certain	   legal	   experience	   resembles	   in	   a	   salient	  way	  the	  clusters	  of	  experiences	  that	  make	  us	  believe	  in	  the	  existence	  of	  naïve	  realities”	  (Fittipaldi	   2012,	   28).	   This	   relation	   of	   “resemblance”	   is	   analogous	   to	  what	   I	   have	  called	   institutional	   mimesis,	   and	   indeed	   Fittipaldi	   describes	   it	   in	   great	   detail.	  When,	  for	  example,	  Fittipaldi	  explains	  how	  the	  bilaterality	  of	  debts	  can	  create	  the	  illusion	   that	   these	  have	  a	   sort	  of	   location	   (Fittipaldi	  2012,	  216)	  or	  when	  he	   says	  that	   “in	   naïve	   legal	   ontology	   the	   transformation	   of	   an	   obligatory	   facere	   into	  another	  obligatory	  facere	  is	  experienced	  much	  as	  the	  transformation	  of	  some	  milk	  into	   a	  piece	  of	   cheese,	   or	   of	   some	  wood	   into	   a	   chair”	   (Fittipaldi	   2012,	   232),	   it	   is	  quite	   clear	   that	   he	   has	   in	   mind	   metaphoric	   phenomena	   very	   similar	   to	   those	  discussed	  in	  this	  paper.	  But	  the	  conclusion	  he	  draws	  in	  a	  distinctively	  Petrazyckian	  way—that	  this	  psychological	  rooting	  shows	  that	  these	  entities	  are	  merely	  illusory,	  nothing	  other	  than	  a	  sort	  of	  mental	  projection—seems	  to	  me	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  theory	   of	   legal	   institutions	   as	   artifacts	   presented	   here.	   According	   to	   this	   theory,	  institutions	   are	   not	   illusory	   because	   rooted	   in	   concepts.	   Rather,	   they	   are	   real	   as	  other	   artifacts	   are,	   but	   they	   are	   immaterial,	   just	   like	   other	   artifacts	   consisting	   of	  semantic	  contents.	  They	  have	  been	  created	  and	  have	  been	  historically	  developed,	  and	   they	  play	  a	   fundamental	   role	   in	  our	   life.	  They	  have	  a	  history—a	  deliberative	  history	   consisting	   of	   intentional	   states	   and	   other	   mental	   and	   behavioural	  phenomena—and	  the	  same	  is	  true	  of	  works	  of	  art,	  works	  of	  literature,	  games,	  the	  Internet,	  differential	  equations,	  etc.	  As	  Fauconnier	  and	  Turner	  eloquently	  write:	  


















(4)	   John	  must	  do	  what	  he	  has	  promised.	  Luke	   is	  entitled	   to	  receive	   from	  John	  what	  he	  has	  promised.	  (5)	  But	  they	  are	  under	  the	  moonlight.	  (6)	  Under	   the	  moonlight,	   the	   transmission	   of	   fluids	   upon	   contact	   is	   contrasted	   by	   force	   of	  gravity.	  What	   happens	   here?	   What	   conclusion	   would	   Luke	   and	   John	   draw?	   On	   the	   one	  hand,	   if	   we	   just	   go	   by	   the	   constitutive	   rules	   of	   a	   promissio,	   that	   institution	   has	  strictly	  speaking	  been	  correctly	  performed.	  But,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  if	  we	  look	  at	  the	  mimetic	  grounds	  of	   that	   institution,	   something	  significant	  has	  happened	   that	  can	  hinder	   the	   derivation	   of	   normative	   conclusion	   (4)	   without	   being	   part	   of	   the	  institution’s	  constitutive	  rule	  (1).	  In	  this	  case,	  a	  normative	  conclusion—that	  John	  is	  not	   obligated	   to	   do	   anything,	   and	   Luke	   is	   not	   entitled	   to	   receive	   anything	   from	  John—would	   be	   derivable	   from	   the	   factual	   statements	   (5)	   and	   (6)	   without	   any	  constitutive	   rule	   ensuring	   this	  derivation	  under	  normative	   assumptions,	   because	  as	   we	   have	   seen,	   institutional	   mimesis	   is	   very	   often	   an	   underlying,	   tacit	  presupposition.	  The	  problem,	  here,	   is	  how	  much	  Luke	  and	   John	  are	  aware	  of	   the	  mimetic	   character	   of	   their	   concept	   of	   promissio	   and	   how	  much	   they	   can	   detach	  themselves	   from	   the	   institution’s	   supposed	   “naturality”	   by	   simply	   considering	   a	  
promissio	  a	  normative	  artifact.	  This	  problem	  was	  certainly	  not	  unknown	  to	  Roman	  jurists.	  In	  fact,	  they	  developed	  Roman	  law	  exactly	  in	  that	  direction.	  The	  question	  is	  whether	  we	  are	  still	  aware	  of	  it.	  	  	   Corrado	  Roversi	  University	  of	  Bologna	  –	  School	  of	  Law	  Via	  Galliera	  3	  40121	  Bologna	  corrado.roversi@unibo.it	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